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Abstract 
In academia as well as in mainstream media, people are voicing concern that a fragmented 
media environment, entailing an immense increase of alternative media, may motivate selective 
exposure, in turn leading to increasingly polarized perceptions of society among the public. 
Consulting the theory of reinforcing spirals (RSM), there is ample evidence for a reciprocal 
relationship between selective media exposure and sociotropic beliefs – potentially sparking 
polarization dynamics. Gaps in societal perceptions have furthermore been noted between men 
and women, yet never examined in a RSM context. The purpose of this study is thus to analyse 
whether news media usage in general – and alternative media usage in particular – can explain 
gender differences in sociotropic beliefs and polarization over time. To address these questions 
empirically, this thesis relies on longitudinal panel survey data (N=1,508). Through descriptive 
analyses, path analyses and cross-lagged panel analyses, it examines gendered perceptions on 
the issues of climate change, immigration and crime and potential gender differences in belief 
polarization. The main theoretical contribution of this study is ultimately an increased 
understanding of the dynamics of alternative media usage and issue perception over time 
through the synthetization of the RSM and theories of sociotropic belief formation.   
 
Taken together, the key finding of this thesis is that gender indeed matters. The results 
specifically point towards: (1) substantial and significant gender gaps in sociotropic beliefs over 
time, (2) that disparity in media usage and interpersonal communication cannot account for 
these gender differences when controlling for ideology and political interest, (3) signs of 
reinforcing spirals between alternative media, sociotropic beliefs and interpersonal 
communication and finally (4) gender contingent differences in tendency of polarization 
through RSM. 
 
Keywords: Reinforcing spirals, selective exposure, media effects, alternative media, gender 
gap, interpersonal communication, belief polarization. 
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1 Introduction 
In summaries of the past decade, polarization is the big trend-word. In media as well as 
academia, citizens are described as standing in their respective corners, scattered in digital and 
political filter bubbles. On the editorial page at a leading Swedish newspaper, the 10th century 
was asserted as “[T]he time of division, polarization and disintegration” (Dagens Nyheter, 
31/12-19). The domestic political commentator of public service television declared flatly, 
“Increasing polarization in important political issues risks reducing confidence in the 
parliamentary parties” (Knutson, 1/1-2020) and scholars have further declaimed such premise: 
”[P]olarization militates against social and political stability by reducing the probability of 
group formation at the center of the opinion distribution and by increasing the likelihood of the 
formation of groups with distinctive, irreconcilable policy preferences.” (DiMaggio et al., 1996, 
p. 693). However, polarization levels are not only increasing in terms of attitudes and opinions 
toward social issues, but also in terms of perceptions of reality (Kahan, 2015). A society in 
which people have vastly different perceptions of reality is more polarized and potentially more 
conflict-ridden, than a society in which the absolute majority have a remotely shared perception 
of the state of affairs. Where there are different perceptions of the situation – there is also room 
for conducting opinion or politicizing disagreements (Nordin & Oscarsson, 2015).  
 
While most scholars studying polarization processes, attitude or perceptions related, often focus 
on aggregate level developments, either within or between countries, this thesis will argue that 
there are reasons for academia to examine men and women as subjects of subgroups of 
polarization. Political observers have noted a growing "gender gap" in electoral behaviour since 
1980 (DiMaggio et al., 1996) and findings from Swedish survey polls finds increasing political 
polarization levels between men and women, demonstrating that women and men are 
positioning themselves farther apart on the political left-right scale compared to previous 
surveys. While women appear to become more left-leaning, men are becoming increasingly 
right-leaning (Naurin & Öhberg, 2019). If differences in voting patterns, nevertheless, reflect 
divergence in perceptions of reality remains contested. Previous research has demonstrated 
gender differences in various values and attitudes (Beutel & Marini, 1995) and indicated gender 
effects on perception formation on several issues in society (Nordin & Oscarsson, 2015). If 
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there indeed is a growing gender gap, extending to the perception of reality, this could 
potentially trigger yet another dimension of the polarization complexity.  
 
Moreover, these processes have in an abundance of social science disciplines throughout the 
past century been found to relate to people’s media use (e.g. Slater, 2007, 2015; Delli Carpini 
et al., 2004). The media environment is, nevertheless, changing rapidly. This change entails a 
proliferation of media sources and fragmentation of the media audience (Dahlgren et al., 2019). 
Like many other western countries, Sweden has experienced a decline of traditional news media 
consumption (Blekesaune et al., 2012), and several alternative news sources, such as Nyheter 
Idag, Fria Tider and Samhällsnytt, have emerged (Holt, 2018). These outlets many times 
provide alternative worldviews and content that explicitly challenge the traditional media 
agenda (Shehata et al., 2020). This transition has raised concerns related to how increasing 
media choice influences selective exposure and how increasing selective exposure might 
influence political beliefs, attitudes and behaviours – culminating fear of polarization. Is it 
possible that the changing media environment can explain parts of the gender gap in perceptions 
of reality? Even though this query has been of analytical foci yet, there is reason to expect this 
prediction is correct. This overbridging hypothesis – with research on reinforcing spirals model 
and sociotropic belief formation as its benchmark – will be the focus of this thesis.   
 
1.1 Studying reinforcing spirals in sociotropic beliefs 
Academia seemingly agrees upon that the supply of politically biased news outlets has 
increased (Holt, 2018; Dahlgren et al., 2019; Stroud, 2011) and that people, when allowed to 
choose among a wide range of media, tend to opt for sources which are in line with their own 
pre-existing beliefs and opinions (Dvir Gvirsman, 2014; Knobloch & Hoplamazian, 2012). Yet, 
there is doubt concerning whether selective exposure leads to increasing polarization 
(Levendusky, 2013; Prior, 2013).  
 
Theoretically, the most relevant model for studying the process of selective exposure to 
alternative media and its effects is the reinforcing spirals model (hereafter denoted as RSM). 
While the model suggests that selective exposure to attitude-congruent content and media 
effects ought to be considered as “two components of a larger dynamic process by which such 
social identities, attitudes and behaviors are maintained” (Slater, 2015, p. 371), this thesis will 
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argue that the model is equally fit to examine processes of sociotropic beliefs formation, and 
that such focus serves a purpose both in the context of RSM and polarization. Most studies, 
namely, concentrate on public attitude to gain an understanding of political polarization 
processes, as attitudes is a central concept to study behaviour (Brousmiche et al., 2016). 
However, it fails to understand how such attitudes are formed in the first place. The traditional 
way of conceptualising the link between beliefs and attitudes is to view beliefs as causally prior 
to attitudes, as some scholars suggest beliefs and evaluations of some attributes compose an 
attitude (e.g., Brousmiche et al., 2016). Most conventional, though, is to focus on the reciprocal 
causal direction of attitudes and beliefs. Thus, an individual’s perception of reality may be a 
core component when that person forms an attitude toward a societal issue – just like a person’s 
attitude may influence how he or she perceives society. When studying polarization processes, 
it therefore seems equally important to examine people’s belief formation and maintenance.  
        
1.2 Gender differences in the RSM 
Despite research demonstrating that there is a persistent gender gap in media selection patterns 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Hoplamazian, 2012) and that alternative media in a Swedish context 
seems to mainly function as platforms for men (Holt, 2018), research has not yet studied how 
or if men and women are affected differently by the changing media environment. There is still 
lacking research on whether men and women are equally susceptible to media messages – 
although sex- and gender-related traits have been suggested to work as a key mediator for 
emotional and cognitive responses to news- and other media content (Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Alter, 2007). Accordingly, gender has neither been incorporated in a focal relationship with the 
RSM. This thesis ultimately intends to answer if differential media selection and effects 
between men and women can explain gender differences in perceptions. 
 
If men indeed are more likely to use alternative media than women, following the expected 
gender-oriented media selection differences, such exposure may according to the RSM, lead to 
increasing division in men’s and women’s perception of reality in what may be described as a 
belief polarization process. This, in turn, should lead to even more alternative media use among 
men, in a mutually reinforcing spiral, until a satisfactory equilibrium is reached (Slater, 2007; 
2015). However, it remains unknown on what range of issues and to what magnitude alternative 
media can shape perceptions. Moreover, following studies indicating that men and women hold 
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widely different issue positions on several sociotropic phenomena, it does seem likely that these 
polarization processes may vary between different issues and that the concern for alternative 
media could be exaggerated. This motivates why this thesis will examine polarization levels 
towards three social issues, namely: climate change, immigration and crime. These issues were 
chosen because they are similar in the sense that they are salient on the public agenda as well 
as the media agenda (Boati, 2019; Furtenbach & Westerholm, 2019) – but intrinsically different 
in nature. Swedish alternative media platforms are recognised for principally targeting issues 
of immigration and crime in their reporting (Holt, 2018). While the issue of climate change is 
not the most salient topic among alternative media, they are still expected to use counter-frames 
compared to mainstream media that have been found to largely frame the issue in the same way 
(Shehata et al., 2020). 
 
These sociotropic phenomena were thus chosen to examine and disentangle the reinforcing 
processes behind media use and issue perception, and to observe if such processes are universal 
or rather issue-specific. Examining this kind of cross-issue heterogeneity is a vital next step 
toward a more general understanding of the effects of interest (Levendusky, 2017).  
 
1.3 Research objective and questions 
One issue raised by scholars within the field of media effects is that many studies are limited in 
terms of understanding the mutual influence between selective exposure and attitudes or beliefs 
over time, as most of them are based on cross-sectional surveys, two-wave panel studies or 
experiments (e.g. Stroud, 2010; Feldman et al., 2014). To understand the processes of selective 
exposure and their effects on perceptions of societal issues, multi-wave panel surveys covering 
a more extended period are needed (Dahlgren et al., 2019). This thesis, thus, is a longitudinal 
study aiming to investigate how a limited set of perceptions about society has changed during 
the course of two years. In many cases, it is possible to make valuable comparisons of the results 
with what is known from prior studies about how opinions and beliefs have developed in 
various areas, such as people’s approach to immigration and climate change. However, it is not 
necessarily the change itself that is the key focus of this thesis, but whether the perceptions of 
men and women are becoming more varied, and if this is related to their media consumption.  
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Despite indications of increasing gaps in people’s perceptions of reality coupled with increasing 
ideological gaps between men and women, no systematic research has, as mentioned above, 
been devoted to synthesising reinforcing polarization processes and gender. Hence, it remains 
ambiguous whether the concern that selective exposure to alternative media will lead to belief 
polarization within the public is justified.  
 
Empirically, the thesis uses data from a three-wave panel study conducted in Sweden over a 
period of almost two years, allowing for an analysis of reinforcing spirals between selective 
news media use and perceptions of societal issues over an extended period. By comparing the 
effects of selective exposure to both traditional news media and alternative media, it is possible 
to assess if and how the rapidly changing media environment influences men’s and women’s 
belief formation and maintenance. To examine potential gender dynamics in this process, the 
thesis will employ theoretical insights from the RSM and studies on gendered differences in 
opinion formation and media use. 
 
Against this background, the purpose of this study is to analyse whether news media usage in 
general – and alternative media usage in particular – can explain gender differences in 
sociotropic beliefs and polarization over time. Thereby, the thesis will provide an opportunity 
to adjudicate among competing media effect hypotheses, while also increasing an 
understanding of how people form and maintain perceptions about three salient societal-level 
phenomena and whether gender affects this process.  
 
The main questions which will guide the study are structured into two parts in order to capture 
the two key dimensions of the thesis, namely: what constitutes gendered differences in 
sociotropic beliefs and whether gender affects media-driven polarization. To reach the 
formulated aims, the following research questions were developed:  
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Part 1: Gendered differences in sociotropic beliefs 
 RQ1: How do sociotropic beliefs differ between men and women, and how do these 
differences develop over time? 
 RQ2: How do personal news media usage differ between men and women, and how do these 
differences develop over time? 
RQ3: To what extent are gendered differences in sociotropic beliefs explained by media usage 
and interpersonal communication?   
 
Part 2: Gendered differences in polarization 
RQ4: To what extent is (a) the relationship between media usage and sociotropic beliefs 
characterized by mutually reinforcing spirals, and (b) are these reinforcement processes 
moderated by gender?  
RQ5: Are these reinforcement processes universal or issue specific?   
 
This thesis will begin with a theoretical overview involving an attempt to define RSM, a 
description of its key features and the theoretical underpinnings of polarization and theories 
related to gender. Secondly, this thesis will account for its methodology. In this section, most 
suitable research designs and methods for the dataset is identified. A demonstration of the 
findings will follow this section. The study ends with a discussion about the results and a 
conclusion. 
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2 Theory and background 
In this section, the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the study are expanded upon. 
The study is primarily informed by polarization, reinforcing spirals model and theories of 
sociotropic belief formation. Polarization will foremost be conceived as a framework that 
allows for analyses of changes in sociotropic beliefs among the public. While the concept 
comprises neither a sole definition nor tools for measurement, the RSM will be utilized to link 
changes in sociotropic beliefs and the effects of the changing media environment, as the theory 
is commonly used to examine polarization processes (Slater, 2015). Theories of selective 
exposure and media effects (intrinsic theories of the RSM), coupled with theories of sociotropic 
belief formation, will aid in explaining potential gender differences in these processes. The 
concepts of belief and perception will be used interchangeably.  
 
The theory section is structured to mirror the two parts dividing the research questions; gender 
differences in sociotropic beliefs and gender differences in polarization. This structure, which 
is further extended in the findings section, provides a favourable viewpoint into the relationship 
between gender and media-driven belief polarization.  
 
2.1 Gendered perceptions of reality 
The concept of sociotropic beliefs refers to citizens’ beliefs about society (Shehata et al., 2020), 
and will in this study be used interchangeably with the concept of issue perception. Public 
opinion research has previously demonstrated that the way men and women can hold and 
express perceptions about the existence, severity and causes of societal-level issues – which 
they often have minimal knowledge of or cannot experience personally – is based on a complex 
set of factors (Shehata et al., 2020). Media use is among public opinion scholars emphasised as 
one of the most prominent factors in shaping people’s perceptions of societal-level phenomena 
(chiefly established through research on selective exposure and media effects, elaborated on in 
the following sections) (e.g. Kumlin, 2004; Mutz, 1998; Shehata et al., 2020). However, Mutz 
(1998, p. 62) argues that there are “three other possible sources of information which may shape 
collective experience and opinion: rationalization based on partisan predispositions, personal 
experience, and interpersonal communication”. Ideological or partisan predispositions are 
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stressed since they have been found to exert a substantial effect on how men and women 
perceive the character, prevalence and causes of issues in society (Lodge & Taber, 2006; 
Shehata et al., 2020). The impact of personal experience, suggested as the second potential 
source of sociotropic perceptions, is highly disputed in the literature. While some research 
stresses that personal experiences may have a substantial impact on societal issue perceptions 
given its immediate accessibility and tangibility (Shehata, 2020), others argue there is little 
evidence that sociotropic beliefs are formed as generalizations or extensions of people’s 
personal life experiences (Mutz, 1998). Finally, interpersonal communication is highlighted as 
the fourth source of sociotropic perceptions, also is expected to relate to media usage. The 
expected impact of interpersonal communication will be closely examined in the subsequent 
section.  
This thesis will take into consideration three of the main factors suggested  shaping people’s 
perceptions of societal-level phenomena, as expressed by public opinion literature on 
sociotropic beliefs (Kumlin, 2004; Mutz, 1998; Shehata et al., 2020). These factors are media 
use (selective exposure and media effects), social identity (attitude accessibility, ideology and 
political interest) and interpersonal communication. As this study relies on secondary data, 
coupled with its highly debated impacts, it will not account for personal experience. Finally, 
these factors will be employed to examine issue perception towards climate change, criminality 
and immigration.  
 
2.1.1 The role of media  
The mass media are typically considered vital when it comes to judgements of societal-level 
developments and is famously described by Walter Lippmann (1922) as “the window to the 
world outside”. Media reporting is similarly emphasised and demonstrated as a source of 
sociotropic perceptions in the literature pool of belief formation and research on theories of 
agenda-setting, cultivation and framing (e.g., Kenix, 2011; McCombs, 2014; Mutz, 1998; 
Slater, 2007). In what ways media really affects its audience may be studied through a variety 
of theories. Most established is probably agenda-setting theory by McCombs and Shaw (1993), 
typically focusing on the influence of topics of coverage in the media on issue salience for the 
public as a whole. Another prominent media effect theory is framing theory. This research 
usually explores how media’s interpretation of issues influence how member of the public 
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interpret these issues. These theories are, as will be further elaborated on in subsequent sections, 
largely intrinsic in the RSM which, in conformity with the ideas aloft, partly relies on the 
assumptions that media usage may influence attitudes and behaviour. While researchers have 
not yet explicitly examined if men and women are equally susceptible to media effects, findings 
suggest that for emotional and cognitive responses to news and other media content, sex- and 
gender-related traits work as a key mediator, in that they channel selective information intake 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Alter, 2007). Nevertheless, it remains to this thesis to test whether 
media effects indeed are channelled differently between men and women, and if so, how this 
plays out.    
 
For media effects to occur, however, people need to be exposed to such content, which within 
a high-choice media environment often requires some degree of selection. Men and women 
have in several selective exposure studies been found to largely select different media content 
(e.g. Knobloch-Westerwick & Hoplamazian, 2012). While men tend to be more interested than 
women in international affairs, news, and, women are more likely to favour social and 
interpersonal topics sports (The Pew Research Center, 2008). The differences remain 
statistically significant after controlling for a broad set of socio-demographic characteristics, 
such as income, education, or employment status (Knobloch-Westerwick & Hoplamazian, 
2012). Knobloch-Westerwick and Alter (2007) further suggest that biological sex and gender 
are two of the most dominant factors when it comes to explaining alteration in media selectivity. 
In a cross-country setting, the news gender gap is correlated with measures of gender equality, 
and it is particularly abundant in countries with low scores of gender equality in politics and 
the economy (Benesch, 2012).  
Finally, building upon theories of sociotropic belief formation and media effects in a 
fragmented media environment, this thesis thus focuses on the development and maintenance 
of sociotropic beliefs among people over time. More specifically, it analyses how one distinct 
component of men’s and women’s general media consumption – usage of alternative online 
news – influence perceptions about climate change, crime and immigration. The role of 
alternative media in comparison to mainstream media will be reviewed next. 
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2.1.2 The role of alternative media 
Whereas most studies interested in the RSM and polarization processes focus on the tendency 
of partisan selective exposure based on pre-existing attitudes, this thesis will consider how 
Swedish people’s media consumption – and foremost alternative media habits – affect how they 
formulate and maintain beliefs. In recent years, corresponding to the emergence of a high choice 
media environment, an immense increase in alternative media outlets has been noted (Newman 
et al., 2018; Holt, 2018). These outlets are characterized for positioning themselves as 
correctives of the mainstream news media (Holt et al., 2019) and thus provide people with an 
option of finding different views of the world than the one presented in mainstream media. On 
these outlets, news dissemination is no longer only undertaken by journalists, but also by 
algorithms and non-professionals (Thorson & Wells, 2016).  
 
Historically, studies about alternative media have often taken their cue from Gramsci and the 
notion of hegemony. In such a setting alternative media is seen as a liberating force that gives 
voice to marginalized groups in the hegemonic discourse of mainstream media. While the 
phrase “mainstream media” foremost has been used by media scholars and by left-wing 
debaters like Noam Chomsky, “alternative media” has been considered “[T]he embodiment of 
a dream about giving ordinary citizens a way of speaking back to power.” (Holt, 2018, p. 50). 
Moreover, their audiences have been said to constitute an interpretive community (Rauch, 
2007). Alternative media, then, are sites where people sharing similar political orientations 
articulate their responses to particular matters or new issues. 
 
Although users of alternative or partisan websites in several countries show a diverse profile, 
they tend to be older, politically interested and more partisan and ideologically extreme than 
the rest of the public (Stroud, 2011). They are also predominately male (Digital News Report, 
2018). As alternative media aim to challenge the symbolic power of mainstream media, their 
audiences are expected to have low trust in mainstream media (Leung & Lee, 2014; Shehata et 
al., 2020). In a process of selective exposure, Tsfati and Cappella (2003) found that intense 
scepticism of and erosion of trust in the mainstream media also could contribute to alternative 
media usage. Sceptics of mainstream media today typically claim hegemonic mainstream media 
distort or conceal information that does not fit the “politically correct” agenda. Mainstream 
journalists are seen as people who for the sake of personal and commercial gains will sacrifice 
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accuracy and precision and, thus, not considered fair or objective in their reporting of society 
(Tsfati, 2003).  
 
Since ‘mainstream media’ plays a crucial role in alternative news media’s self-perception, it is 
essential to understand what mainstream media constitutes. Holt et al. (2019) recognise 
mainstream news media as a societal system that is formed by specific legacy news media 
organizations. These organizations are then themselves characterized by certain – often 
hierarchical – organizational structures and traditional publishing routines. They enable public 
discourse by providing topics of general interest, which are based on facts, selected by 
professionals, and published following professional rules. Accordingly, mainstream news 
media fulfil a societal function (Holt et al., 2019). Similar to the pattern of the alternative media 
audience, it appears to be foremost older people who regularly use mainstream media. 
 
Even though the Swedish media market, for instance, entails public service as well as tabloids, 
broadsheets and commercial channels, this thesis will argue that they still fit under the umbrella-
term 'mainstream media' since they still follow traditional publishing routines and professional 
model based on the principles of objectivity and political neutrality. This separates them from 
alternative media which operate in distinctively different ways. Alternative media remain more 
ideologically driven than the mainstream media and generally, though not exclusively, less 
commercially minded (Kenix, 2011).  
 
While Sweden indeed has several left-leaning alternative media platforms (e.g. Dagens Arena, 
Arbetet and Aktuellt Fokus), alternative media has in recent years foremost been associated 
with immigration-critical media, known for an insistently oppositional stance concerning both 
the media and political establishment. Following Holt’s (2018, p.52) definition, alternative 
media in a Swedish context refers to: “A self-assumed term that signals an opposition to 
traditional media (“old media”), which many of the writers in this field regard as failing to 
report properly on important societal issues, for example, by avoiding reporting on social 
problems related to immigration.” There are furthermore indications that immigration-critical 
alternative media (ICAM) in Sweden have a significant reach (Newman et al., 2018). Survey 
data presented in the Reuters Institute Digital News Report show that each of the four largest 
ICAM in Sweden (Fria Tider, Nyheter Idag, Ledarsidorna, Samhällsnytt and Nya Tider) reaches 
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around one-tenth of the Swedish online population weekly (Newman et al., 2018). This makes 
Sweden an interesting case for the present study. Although there are, as mentioned above, 
multiple alternative media platforms which are heavy left-leaning too, these are not remotely 
as widespread as the right-leaning alternatives (Sandberg & Ihlebæk, 2019). This yet poses a 
problem as to how to conceptualize and interpret the phenomenon, which will be discussed 
later. This study now moves on to describe the second factor suggested to shape people’s 
perceptions of societal-level phenomena, namely social identity.  
 
2.1.3 The role of social identity 
Social identity as a factor shaping issue perception among men and women can be fractioned 
into numerous subcategories that largely depends on which scientific disciplinary one adheres 
to. In this study, social identity is allegedly captured through attitude accessibility, embodied 
by ideology and political interest, as proposed by the RSM and theories of sociotropic belief 
formation. 
 
A central aspect of the RSM is the proposal of social cognitive mechanisms that may help 
explain how attitudes, or in this case perceptions, may be reinforced by choice of media 
exposure. Principal among these is attitude accessibility (Slater, 2015). Attitudes that are 
central to personal or social identity are normally chronically accessible (Fazio et al., 1989). As 
declared in the introduction, the current study considers the causal direction of attitudes and 
beliefs as reciprocal. There are several reasons why gender differences ought to be expected in 
attitude accessibility. Firstly, certain values predict the amount of importance attached to a 
specific issue. For instance, Huddy et al. (2008) argue that valuing universalism, such as social 
justice and concern for the broader community, predicts greater importance placed on the issue 
of climate change, compared to those who value power (e.g. material achievement). These 
universalist values are further closely linked to a leftist ideology. According to Djerf-Pierre and 
Wängnerud (2016, p. 221) “A leftist ideology typically identifies societal problems as collective 
issues/responsibilities”. Moreover, universalist values and a leftist ideology have been found as 
more common among women (Huddy et al., 2008). Ideology is also proposed as one of the 
factors influencing the belief formation process by public opinion scholars. How men and 
women perceive the character, prevalence, causes and solutions of societal problems are 
suggested to largely depend upon ideological or partisan predispositions (Taber & Lodge, 
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2006). Ideology is further suggested as a critical cognitive tool that people use to process 
political information (Schreiber, 2007). 
 
Secondly, research suggests that political interest or a cognitive orientation and interest to 
political affairs plays a crucial role in determining the patterns of media effects and polarization 
(Strömbäck et al., 2013). In today’s high-choice media environment, for instance, political 
interest has become a more important determinant of news consumption, making the news 
consumption more polarized between news-seekers and news-avoiders over time (Strömbäck 
et al., 2013). Recognizing media as agenda-setters and with a substantial effect on sociotropic 
belief formation, such news consumption gaps may thus lead to belief polarization. Moreover, 
a large body of research documents that women, generally, are less interested, less engaged and 
less knowledgeable in politics than men, and these gender gaps persist even in otherwise highly 
egalitarian societies (Djerf-Pierre & Wängnerud, 2016). Women are also less likely to discuss 
politics with others or attempt to change other people's political attitudes than men (Reed, 
2006).   
 
What this means in the context of this study, is that potential gender differences in the RSM 
and sociotropic beliefs may be related to social identity differences. As ideology is closely 
linked to personal values, which in turn makes certain perceptions and attitudes more likely to 
become chronically accessible, men and women (ideologically different when generalising), 
can be expected to hold different accessibility depending on what societal issue of interest. For 
instance, women are expected to be more left-leaning than men and thus hold more universalist 
values, from which it is possible to predict that they will perceive climate change as a more 
urgent issue to combat. In the same way, crime and punishment is one of the most critical issues 
on the political agenda for right-leaning voters, making it possible to hypothesise that 
perceptions related to this issue more likely will be chronically accessible. Furthermore, 
political interest is expected to be an underlying driver of gender differences in RSM, where 
men are more prone to be interested in politics, hypothetically making them more likely to 
become part of reinforcing processes. Whether this social identity trait (political interest) is a 
bigger RSM-driver than ideology, remain up to this study to examine. Doubtlessly, social 
identity constitutes more than ideology and political interest. However, since this thesis is 
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utilizing secondary data, it is beyond its prospect to incorporate more elements (e.g. Big Five) 
relating to social identity.   
 
2.1.4 The role of interpersonal communication  
Finally, this study will examine what role interpersonal communication (IPC) plays in the 
formation of sociotropic beliefs and the RSM-processes introduced above. Previous studies 
suggest that discussions about political and societal issues with friends and family are settings 
where perceptions of reality are socially negotiated, verified and structured – and not only 
situations where information and experiences are shared (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; 
Schmitt-Beck, 2003; Shehata et al., 2020). However, research concerned with the interaction 
between IPC and reinforcing spirals processes are scarce and in the theoretical underpinning of 
the RSM Slater (2007; 2015) suggests that research on this topic is essential for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the theory. 
 
Because of the findings mentioned aloft, academia broadly conceives that political discussion 
significantly influences people’s attitudes, and arguably also perceptions. Nevertheless, the 
anticipated role of IPC differs among studies and findings point towards that IPC may both 
moderate and mediate the influence of mass media (Schmitt-Beck, 2003). Previous studies have 
found that if a network is homogeneous and a media message is congruent to this group’s views, 
the individual exposed for the message will obtain confirmative reactions when comparing this 
message to any of the other groups member’s position. In the opposing case of a homogeneous 
network and a dissonant media message, a person will always be discouraged from accepting 
this message. If a network is politically or attitudinally mixed, however, a person may encounter 
either favourable or unfavourable reactions from the IPC. Hence, the validation may lead to a 
negative or a positive result depending on whom is involved in the discussion. However, people 
tend to be embedded in homogenous environments and in close-tie interpersonal 
communication, which will be examined in this thesis, there is ultimately an overwhelming 
tendency toward homogeneity (Katz & Lazarfeld, 1955; Schmitt-Beck, 2003). 
 
Continuing, there are reasons to suspect that interpersonal communication will have a different 
effect on men and women. To begin with, scholars have postulated that the direct impact of 
media messages may be bolstered or altered by a person’s network of interpersonal 
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communication and that such discussions are a central explanatory mechanism of a positive 
feedback loop, which may lead to more extreme outcomes (Song & Boomgaarden, 2017). 
While a meta-analysis by Eagly (1978) found no overall sex difference in relation to 
persuasibility, the same study suggested that interpersonal orientation can cause women to be 
more susceptible to influence attempts than men. Support for the idea that women are more 
susceptible to influence than men is further found in a study by Harrison et al. (1991), which 
demonstrated that women were more responsive to the interpersonal communication behaviour 
of a political candidate, whereas men were more responsive to the candidate’s political 
positions.  
 
Additionally, research has found that people using alternative media are prone to spread such 
media messages to others through interpersonal social networks and social media (Howe & 
Krosnick, 2017). This means that individuals whom themselves would never turn to, for 
instance, right-wing outlet Fria Tider, may still be exposed to the messages the outlet 
disseminate on its platform. This is, of course, not a new idea, but was introduced almost 
seventy years ago via the two-step communication flows (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). Likewise, 
a more recent experimental study on this topic found that people who do not take part of partisan 
media outlets but then discuss the covered topics with others, end up polarized in the same way 
as those who watched partisan media programmes. In other words, discussing partisan media 
messages can generate polarization just like exposure itself can (Levendusky, 2017). While it 
still remains unknown if discussing alternative media messages generate similar results, the 
findings demonstrated aloft seem to suggest that: (1) IPC will have an effect on issue perception, 
and (2) IPC may both mediate and moderate media effects on issue perception.  
 
2.2 Gender differences in polarization – explained by the RSM 
Building upon theories of sociotropic belief formation and media use, combined with the core 
concepts of the RSM, this thesis focuses on the development of issue perceptions over time by 
examining underlying drivers of gender differences in RSM. While the previous section 
accounted for how one distinct component of men’s and women’s general media consumption 
– usage of alternative media – coupled with social identity and interpersonal communication, 
may influence perceptions on three salient societal issues, the subsequent segment will 
elaborate on gender differences in polarization and whether the RSM can assist in explaining 
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such dynamics. The main theoretical contribution of this study will ultimately be an increased 
understanding of the dynamics of alternative media use and issue perception over time through 
the synthetisation of the RSM and gender. 
 
2.2.1 Polarization as a concept 
Given polarization’s prominence in contemporary political and societal discourse, the literature 
pool provides strikingly little guidance in defining it. While polarization can relate to the 
strengthening of one’s original position or attitude (Stroud, 2010), some scholars suggest it is 
the mechanism whereby political groups are moved away from the middle of the political 
spectrum and instead moved towards the poles of the spectrum (Dvir Gvirsman, 2014), and 
others maintain that is can be both a state and a process (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). When 
described as a state, researchers refer to the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed 
in relation to some theoretical maximum. This kind of polarization will be examined through 
path analyses in the findings section in order to answer RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3. Polarization as a 
process, on the other hand, refers to the increase in such opposition over time (DiMaggio et 
al.,1996) and will be examined through cross-lagged panel analyses as suggested by the RSM, 
in order to answer RQ4 and RQ5. By consulting the RSM for these analyses, it is possible to 
detect if the diffusion of perceptions is more significant among men than women as a result of 
their media usage (or, in other words, if men more likely to polarize than women). As many 
scholars fear that current polarization processes in society are – if not due to – linked to, 
increasing selective exposure in the high-choice media environment, a growing body of 
literature in communication are studying reinforcement processes between patterns of media 
usage and long-term, society-level effects on polarization (e.g., Feldman et al., 2014; Slater, 
2007; Beam et al., 2018). Under certain contingencies, which will be elaborated on further 
below, the RSM suggests that an individual whom select media content that is consistent with 
pre-existing attitudes, ought to foster extremes of media use and attitudes, and ultimately 
polarization, in an ongoing chain of influence. Besides, empirical analyses reflect that people 
are indeed getting more extreme values and that such polarization processes may be explained 
by reinforcing spirals (e.g., Dahlgren et al., 2019; Song & Boomgaarden, 2017).  
 
While gender is seldom the key variable in polarization research, differences have been 
documented in a vast array of studies. In relation to sociotropic beliefs in a Swedish context, 
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Nordin and Oscarsson (2015), found that men’s and women’s perceptions differ significantly 
with regards to discrimination of women (women perceived the issue of discrimination on the 
workplace as worse than men), Sweden’s business climate (men perceive it as better than 
women) and culture of immigrants (women believed that the culture and traditions of 
immigrants enrich Swedish society to a higher degree than do men). Other studies have, for 
instance, found that women have a more positive perception of immigration and gun-control 
measures than men (Huddy et al., 2008). 
 
One issue with polarization, which ought to be emphasised, is that interpreting polarization 
levels is, generally, a matter of judgement. Thus, to analyse polarization levels, one must be 
able to define it. To define polarization, one must be clear about why one is interested in it. 
Ultimately, the premise of this thesis is that belief polarization militates against social and 
political stability by reducing the likelihood of group formation at the centre of the opinion 
distribution and by increasing the probability of the formation of groups with distinctive, 
irreconcilable policy preferences. Moreover, the thesis will examine both ‘between-populations 
polarization’ and ‘in-group polarization’ (DiMaggio et al., 1996), meaning that foci of analysis 
will first of all be the differences between men and women in levels of belief polarization, and 
secondly polarization levels among men and women as separate groups.  
  
2.2.2 The Reinforcing Spirals Model 
As outlined above, there is a lack of studies testing if there might be so-called reinforcing spiral 
processes between media consumption (specifically alternative media use) and issue 
perceptions. The leading theory which this thesis will build on, and hopefully add to, is thus the 
reinforcing spirals model (RSM), which chiefly aims to understand the role of media in creating 
and maintaining beliefs (Slater, 2015). Since the model is somewhat complex and has many 
different aspects, the presentation is divided into four central aspects of the model: definition, 
the marriage of selective exposure and media effects, the importance of feedback loops and 
empirical findings coupled with theoretical gaps. 
 
2.2.2.1 Definition  
The theory was coined by Slater in 2007. RSM seeks to understand “media's role in helping 
create and sustain both durable and more transient attitudes, as well as behaviours associated 
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with those attitudes” (Slater, 2015, p. 370). While the theory only addresses attitudes and 
behaviours, Slater (2015) claims that these concepts also incorporates values, social identities 
such as ideology, lifestyle community, religious conviction and more transient attitudes (e.g. 
about social policies and other social groups). Based on the argument that belief is a core 
component of attitudes (Brousmiche et al., 2016), this thesis maintains that the RSM is equally 
fit to examine media’s role in creating and sustaining beliefs.  
 
The RSM relies on two fundamental assumptions. To begin with, media use is both the 
independent variable and the dependent variable, referring to media use as something shaped 
by social context and individual characteristics, and that this media usage may influence 
attitudes and behaviour. Secondly, RSM assumes that media use and effects are part of a 
dynamic and ongoing process. Exposure to the self-selected media, influenced by social identity 
and context, is consequently suggested to “influence subsequent strength and accessibility of 
social group identification, attitudes, and behaviors—which, in turn, will influence subsequent 
media use, which should continue to reinforce those associated elements of social identity, 
attitude, and behavior over time” (Slater, 2015, p. 372). In other words, the influence does not 
merely flow from alternative or mainstream media use to perceptions of societal issues, or from 
perceptions to alternative or mainstream media use. Rather, the effect of using specific media 
types should influence the strength and accessibility of certain beliefs — which in turn should 
influence people’s media selection, leading to reinforced societal issue beliefs over time 
(Feldman et al., 2014; Slater, 2015). 
 
Slater (2015) argues that there is ample evidence for effects of media-use variables on beliefs, 
behaviour and attitudes even after controlling for prior influences. These results he contests 
against that the way in which people select media content are, amongst others, a function of 
age, gender, prior experience, ideology, social identity and influences. These media-use 
variables, Slater (2007) suggests, are endogenous (subject to the influence of causally prior 
variables). Ultimately, from a theoretical perspective, the role of media-use variables is an 
intervening one and should mediate or partially mediate the influences of individual-difference 
variables, such as gender, age, prior experience and interests on cognitive or behavioural 
outcomes. To what extent alternative media consumption function as an endogenous variable, 
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how such usage affects societal issue-perceptions and if this process differs between men and 
women, remains up to this study to examine.  
 
2.2.2.2 Selective exposure and media effects as two components of RSM 
Slater (2007) suggests mediation through media-use variables as described above, for some 
phenomena, is a simple formulation of the relationship between media selectivity and media 
effect processes. Media effects may, as aforementioned, be studied through a variety of 
theories. While agenda-setting research normally studies the major media in society, the 
perspective of the RSM would suggest the importance of examining the agenda-setting 
influence of group-specific media (Slater, 2007), such as alternative media. The chance that 
such sources set issue agendas as well as frame these issues for group members is high (Slater, 
2007). Framing theory is another prominent media effect theory, also described in the prior 
section. The spirals of selectivity and effects perspective would hypothesise that alternative 
media would develop and refine ways of framing issues that are consistent with the values of 
its ‘group members’. Such frames ought to provide interpretive filters for their audience through 
which other mediated information will pass. They should also facilitate counterarguing of 
general media coverage and increase perceptions of media bias when those frames are not 
reflected in dominate media discourse (Vallone et al., 1985). A spirals process, thus, is likely 
to emerge when preferred media outlets construct frames that interpret societal issues in terms 
consistent with group values. Ultimately, group members should increasingly assess nongroup 
media content through those frames and prefer media outlets that reflect such frames.  
 
A prime objective of the RSM is, additionally, to integrate selective exposure processes, as they 
serve as an essential predictor of media effects. Conversely, the model accentuates that the 
effects of media exposure are likely to reinforce preferences that predict media selection in the 
first place. The RSM propose the particular importance of the maintenance of social identity as 
a central aspect of uses or gratification theories (Slater, 2007). Hence, the opportunity to 
counterargue opposing perspectives, or, - probably more common - an affirmation of 
perceptions, is likely to be a central motivator of the selection of media outlet. It is therefore 
emphasized in the RSM that the use of a certain kind of media is likely to reinforce the 
preferences that led to its use in the first place, helping sustain those needs and desired 
gratifications. Consequently, the perspective of the RSM builds upon selectivity and uses‐and‐
20 
gratifications research by including media effects themselves as indicative of such behaviours 
(Slater, 2007).  
 
The spirals of selectivity and effects perspective, therefore, has two primary aspects: 1) an 
account for individual-level media use and influence processes over time, and 2) a perspective 
on how such mutually reinforcing processes of media use selection and their effects serve to 
sustain religious, political and lifestyle subcultures (Slater, 2007).  
Finally, Slater (2007) claims that an important starting point in understanding the relationship 
between selectivity and media effects is acknowledging the reciprocal nature of the two. 
However, causal relationships do not go back and forth as the term reciprocal implies. These 
relationships move forward in time, influencing one another, with the probability of reinforcing 
or cumulative effects. Thus, in a research context, exposure at baseline must lead to an effect at 
the second wave that, in turn, influences exposure at the third wave. At the same time, the status 
of the effect at baseline should lead to exposure at the second wave, leading to the effect at the 
third wave.  
 
Figure 1. A minimal path representation of reinforcing spirals as suggested by Slater (2007). 
While prospective prediction usually is of primary interest, a wide variety of alternative 
indirect paths exists. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2.3 The importance of feedback loops 
According to the initial definition of the RSM, an individual whom selected media content 
which was consistent with pre-existing attitudes, ought to foster extremes of media use, 
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attitudes, and behaviours, and ultimately polarization, in an ongoing chain of influence. 
However, in his second article about the RSM, Slater (2015) pays more attention to why spirals 
typically reinforce and maintain attitudes, rather than driving attitudes and opinions towards 
extremes. To explain the reinforcement spiral possibilities to either continuously reinforce 
attitudes or to have reached a satisfying level of reinforcement, he uses the expression “positive 
and negative feedback loops” (p. 373). Positive feedback loops may, for instance, appear during 
high levels of perceived identity threat, as social group norms minimize exposure to offsetting 
perspectives or national cultures control exposure to such perceptions. Under such 
circumstances, the risk of polarization in the shape of more extreme attitudes, increases. 
However, Slater (2015) argues that at some point, the positive feedback loop normally must 
stop. Negative feedback loops, then, take place when homeostasis, which refers to how identity 
relevant attitudes are maintained balanced, is reached. One of the strongest and most 
compelling reasons spirals reach homeostasis is mere that individuals satisfice, as all people 
have multiple social and personal identities. One may be a libertarian, Muslim, a staunch runner, 
a father and a professor. However, time and attention are not infinite resources. Eventually, 
media content associated with one social identity and attention to certain issues comes at the 
cost of devoting resources to other roles and interests. Furthermore, the RSM suggests that 
when social identity is under threat (for instance during political campaigns), selective use of 
attitude-consistent content should increase until a satisfactory equilibrium is obtained. As 
identity threats diminish, such selectivity may be reduced (Slater, 2015).  
 
Subsequent scholarly work has outlined a few other factors that may equilibrate or decrease 
societal polarization in the RSM. Dahlgren et al. (2019) stress that there, indeed, are other 
motivations than only personal that influence media use. Besides, selective exposure does not 
necessarily imply selective avoidance and in the digital environment it is probable that people 
incidentally encounter cross-partisan or attitude-incongruent information too. Moreover, 
recurring exposure to similar information might reduce the influence of the information rather 
than strengthening the attitude or belief (Dahlgren et al., 2019). Finally, much of such 
reinforcement effects are, at least in a Swedish context, hindered by relatively low overall 
ideological selective exposure (Dahlgren et al., 2019) and a substantial degree of cross-cutting 
news media online (Beam et al., 2018).  
 
22 
One of the core intentions of RSM is ultimately to identify environmental or other constraints 
that limit or amplify reinforcing spirals (Slater, 2007, 2015). Accordingly, researchers have 
taken contextual variation in which RSM processes take place into account, such as elections 
cycles and corresponding varying levels of political engagement (Song & Boomgaarden, 2017), 
teenagers and sexually explicit media content (Peter & Valkenburg, 2009) and partisan media 
exposure effects on global warming-beliefs (Feldman et al., 2014), which will be closer 
reviewed in the following section. However, the mechanisms through which these processes 
occur, or which individuals will be affected, remains largely unexamined. While men seemingly 
are more likely to seek out alternative media, it yet remains ambiguous if men are more 
responsive for polarization through these outlets.  
 
2.2.2.4 Review of key empirical studies on RSM  
Since its coinage in 2007, the RSM has been studied in several ways. Over time, the research 
designs have become more fine-grained and complex, covering for the flaws prior studies have 
displayed. Empirical investigations of the RSM within the context of selective exposure and 
polarization are limited and primarily focused on attitude or political polarization (Beam et al., 
2018; Song & Boomgaarden, 2017; Stroud, 2010) and findings are somwehat dispersed.  
  
Stroud (2010) conducted the first study on the RSM concerned with political polarization. By 
utilizing data from panel surveys gathered throughout the 2004 American presidential election, 
she analysed the relationship between selective exposure to partisan media content and political 
polarization. The study demonstrated strong evidence for selective exposure to partisan media 
predicting political polarization. However, evidence supporting the reverse relationship was 
weak. Moreover, the study was not structured so that it could measure an actual dynamic 
reciprocal relationship, but merely if there were effects in both directions. 
 
Song and Boomgaarden (2017), on the other hand, modelled media use and effects as 
endogenous variables as they examined contextual factors that might moderate political 
polarization. Their results indicated that mutually reinforcing spirals were conditioned by 
several individual- and system-level factors, such as interpersonal discussion networks in 
conjunction with election contexts. More precisely, agreement or disagreement among peers 
within an interpersonal network will moderate the effect of polarization (Song & Boomgaarden, 
23 
2017). These results go well with those of Hutchens and colleagues (2019), who also found 
support for a reciprocal relationship between partisan political discussion and political 
polarization. Rather than mediated partisan communication, this study focused on interpersonal 
partisan communication. They, similar to Slater (2007; 2015) argue that interpersonal 
communication is an equally vital source of information as mediated information and, thus, 
research concerning interpersonal communication is essential for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the framework. To examine the association between discussing politics with 
like-minded and polarization and vice versa, Hutchens et al. (2019), used data from a three-
wave panel gathered during 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential campaigns. They found partial 
support for reinforcing spirals in such way that polarization at first wave was associated with 
an increase of discussions with like-minded others at the second wave, which ultimately was 
associated with higher levels of affective polarization at the final wave. However, a significant 
effect was not found when they started the measurement on political discussion.  
 
Dahlgren et al. (2019) also found support for the possibility of the RSM resulting in 
polarization. The scholars studied the reciprocal relationship between selective exposure to 
ideology-consistent media content and political attitudes through a three-wave web panel 
survey in Sweden. Though the study found support for selective exposure to ideology-
consistent content, there was, however, no support for selective avoidance of bipartisan news 
media. People who sought out partisan news were, particularly in an online environment, likely 
to be exposed to bipartisan media too. In relation to reinforcing spirals, the authors found that 
higher use of attitude-consistent news use had reinforcing effects on people’s ideological 
leaning. These are noteworthy findings as political ideology is considered an identity-relevant 
attitude and hence very stable. Although substantively small, such findings further suggest that 
media use may indeed be a part of a continuous long-term process of identity formation 
throughout life (Dahlgren et al., 2019). Additionally, if effects on an identity-relevant attitude 
such as ideology take place, it seems likely that even stronger influences appear on other more 
specific policy opinion or perceptions. Such processes are nonetheless only expected to be 
visible over an extensive period. On the other hand, Beam et al. (2018) did not find any evidence 
of a partisan reinforcing spiral resulting in increased polarization. The scholars examined the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between Facebook news consumption and political 
polarization through a three-wave panel survey during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. 
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Contrary to its hypothesis, the study found that both news use on Facebook and political 
attitudes were quite stable throughout the campaign and even noticed patterns of depolarization 
in relation to Facebook news use. A potential reason for the findings, Beam et al. (2018) 
suggest, is that Facebook news users may be more likely to expose themselves to both partisan 
and bipartisan news due to social media news recommendations. This, in turn, could increase 
the likelihood of being more understanding of counter-partisan arguments.  
       
In recent studies, one key issue is raised regarding specification of the RSM by Slater (2015). 
This involves conceptualizing selective exposure to identity-consistent content with regards to 
extremity versus quantity (ergo if spiralling processes lead to a selection of more attitude-
extreme media content, or if it rather increases consumption). In this study, selective exposure 
is conceptualised with regards to quantity. Moreover, scholars stress that, as aforementioned, 
further attention should be devoted to the role of interpersonal communication, particularly as 
Song & Boomgaarden (2017) argue interpersonal agreement and disagreement may be a central 
explanatory mechanism of a positive feedback process that could lead to more extreme 
outcomes. This, too, goes for exposure to alternative media. Furthermore, what role – if any – 
gender plays the RSM remains unexamined. A similar research gap is also evident in the field 
of media effects, where scholars remain ambiguous towards whether men and women are 
equally susceptible to media effects. Consequently, by taking both gender and interpersonal 
communication into consideration (and thereby expressing receptiveness towards requests from 
academia), the present study may hopefully add to the theory of RSM. 
 
2.3 The societal-level issues  
There are primarily three reasons why this thesis will study the issues of climate change, 
criminality and immigration: (1) they are salient on the media and well as the public agenda 
(Boati, 2019; Furtenbach & Westerholm, 2019), (2) they are, allegedly, frequently portrayed 
disparately in alternative and mainstream media (Holt, 2018), and (3) perceptions are expected 
to differ between men and women (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Nordin & Oscarsson, 2015). A 
compendious review of the issues is provided below, followed by the hypothesised findings.  
 
Climate change: or climate crisis, is arguably the most severe challenge humanity has 
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experienced in modern time. Given global warming and climate changes relative ‘newness’ and 
the much controversy it has provoked worldwide, it seems to be an ideal context in which to 
study the interplay between media use and individual-level issue perceptions. Research has, for 
instance, found evidence for a relationship between selective exposure to attitude-consistent 
information and climate change perceptions (Feldman et al., 2014; Zhao, 2009). Feldman et al. 
(2014) found a connection between the use of conservative media and opposition to climate 
regulation as well as lower belief certainty about global warming. The opposite association was 
found for non-conservative media users. However, the issue is deeply politicized in the U.S., 
causing ideologically oriented media outlets to communicate vastly different information, 
compared to how the issue is treated in Sweden. Even though climate change is a highly salient 
issue in the Swedish news media too, it is primarily framed in the same way and not remotely 
as polarized as in the U.S. However, it is still expected that alternative media are using counter-
frames (Shehata et al., 2020). The relationship between gender and environmental concern has 
been extensively studied and have engaged sociological theories of gender. Gender 
socialization theorists stress that feminine identity emphasizes attachment, empathy and care, 
while masculine identity stresses detachment, control and mastery (McCright, 2010). This 
argument is supported by previous studies, which have shown that women are more concerned 
for climate change than men (McCright, 2010) and are more prone to select media related to 
climate disasters (The Pew Research Center, 2008). As such, it is both an empirically and 
theoretically interesting case for examining both RSM and gender dynamics. The severity of 
the problem urges integration of insights from previous gender work in the sociology of science, 
but also RSM to understand how and why people form and maintain their perceptions of climate 
change. 
 
Criminality: Statistics from Brå (Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2019), demonstrate that the number 
of reported crimes has increased by 10 percent over the last ten years. Crime and penalties was 
one of the most important issues among electorates in the election 2018 (Novus, 2018) and is 
to a high degree dominating the media agenda. One in six head news in Swedish newspapers, 
tv and radio, revolve around criminality and the work put into combatting it (Furtenbach & 
Westerholm, 2019). The issue of crime is also one of the most covered topics among alternative 
media platforms, albeit characterized by a much more negative tonality and critical perspective 
compared to mainstream media (Holt, 2017). While academia has not, to the best of this 
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author’s knowledge, explicitly studied perceptions towards crime with foci on gender 
differences, several studies are demonstrating a persistent gender gap in fear of crime (e.g. 
Huddy et al., 2008). Even though statistics show that women are less likely to be victims of 
both violent and nonviolent crime than men are, they are to a higher degree expected to be 
victims of sexual assault and research found that women are foremost concerned about the 
prospect of sexual assault in any crime situation. These studies have led to the tentative 
conclusion that women are more fearful because of their greater vulnerability in hazardous 
environments. On the other hand, women are also more likely to oppose harsh punishment for 
criminals than men are (Huddy et al., 2008). This makes the issue of crime an interesting case 
for exploring how men’s and women’s media consumption may affect their perception of crime.   
 
Immigration: The issue of immigration and integration was ranked the most important societal 
issue by the Swedish population years of 2015, 2016 and 2017, and still remains as one of the 
most important issues in the Swedish society according to the public. In the 2018 edition of the 
SOM survey, 53 percent of the respondents answered that it was a good proposal to receive 
fewer refugees (Martinsson & Andersson, 2019). Women are, however, overall more in favour 
of immigration than men are (Theorin & Strömbäck, 2019). In a Swedish context, results from 
a three-year, three-wave panel study, showed that there are limited effects of using traditional 
news media on attitudes toward and perceptions of immigration. However, more substantial 
effects were found among people using anti-immigration, right-wing alternative media or pro-
immigration, left-wing alternative media (Theorin & Strömbäck, 2019). Immigration is 
furthermore one of the most covered topics among alternative media platforms in Sweden (Holt, 
2017). When studying public perception toward immigration it is, thus, vastly relevant to 
account for media use, especially alternative media use. Put together, these findings yield 
immigration an appropriate case for examining the factors suggested to shape people’s 
perceptions of societal-level phenomena. 
In sum, alternative media is, thus, expected to cover the issues of immigration, crime and 
climate change substantially different from mainstream media. While immigration and crime 
are expected to be covered with a more critical perspective and negative tonality than in 
mainstream media, the issue of climate change is expected to be reported using counter-frames. 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are structured to mirror the research questions; gender differences in sociotropic 
beliefs and gender differences in polarization. This structure, which is further extended in the 
findings section, provides a favourable viewpoint into the relationship between gender and 
media-driven belief polarization. 
 
Firstly, as prior studies have suggested that sociotropic beliefs perceptions commonly differ 
between men and women (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Nordin & Oscarsson, 2015) and comparable 
gender differences have been noted relating to the three issues of interest, this thesis 
consequently hypothesises: 
     H1: There are divergencies between men’s and women’s perceptions on the issues of climate 
change, criminality and immigration. 
 
Secondly, public opinion scholars have emphasised that media usage and interpersonal 
communication are prominent factors in shaping people’s perceptions of societal-level 
phenomena (e.g. Kumlin, 2004; Mutz, 1998; Shehata et al., 2020) and such factors are further 
believed to differ – both in terms of degree and impact – between men and women (e.g. Eagly, 
1978; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hoplamazian, 2012). Moreover, interpersonal communication 
is suggested to condition media effects and significantly influence people's attitude (and 
arguably also sociotropic beliefs) (Schmitt-Beck, 2003; Song & Boomgaarden, 2017). It is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
  H2: Gendered differences in sociotropic beliefs are explained by disparity in (a) media 
usage, and (b) interpersonal communication. 
 
Finally, the RSM’s main theoretical contribution is, put easily, the marriage of selective 
exposure approaches with media effect studies, in understanding the dynamics of media use 
and influence over time (Slater, 2007; 2015). As effect studies suggest that media usage and 
IPC may influence people’s perceptions of society on the one hand, and evidence from the 
selective exposure literature indicates that perceptions of society influence media usage on the 
other, the relationship appear to be reciprocal. Correspondingly, prior research has proposed 
gender effects in relation to all three components (e.g. Djerf-Pierre & Wängnerud, 2016; Eagly, 
1978; Knobloch-Westerwick & Alter, 2007). The third hypothesis thus states: 
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  H3: There are (a) reinforcing spirals between media usage, issue perceptions and 
interpersonal communication, and (b) these processes are conditioned by gender.   
 
Against this backdrop, the present study will move on to examine the causal links between 
gender and reinforcing spirals of issue perception more closely by using three methodological 
approaches. First, a descriptive analysis of the characteristics and magnitude of gender 
differences in alternative media use and polarization levels to the three issues will be conducted. 
Based on that analysis, the thesis moves on to study if how gender effects sociotropic beliefs 
and whether interpersonal communication mediates this effect by employing mediational SEM 
analyses. This is followed by cross-lagged analyses, targeting to answer if the RSM can assist 
in explaining the predicted gender differences.  
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3 Research design and methods 
To being with, this thesis will apply a quantitative research approach as it aims to statistically 
provide evidence on whether men’s and women’s perceptions on a range of societal issues 
differ, and if these differences are maintained and conceivably reinforced through selective 
exposure to alternative media.  Since the idea is to test hypotheses which are generated from 
existing theory (the RSM and theories of sociotropic beliefs), this study will follow a deductive 
approach. Moreover, it will apply a positivist epistemological position, and an objectivist 
ontological perspective as these perspectives are closely related to the approaches mentioned 
above. Furthermore, a longitudinal data analysis was conducted. This provides a favourable 
viewpoint into the relationship between gender and belief polarization and makes it possible to 
both detect and draw firm conclusions relating to “spiral effects” (Slater, 2007; Slater, 2015) 
between news use and polarization levels.   
 
3.1 Cultivation panel  
To address the research questions and hypotheses, this study relies on a three-wave Swedish 
panel survey. The survey was conducted by LORE (Laboratory of Opinion Research) on behalf 
of a research group at the department for media and communication at the University of 
Gothenburg. The purpose of the survey was to study long-term cultivation of sociotropic beliefs 
(Martinsson et al., 2020). Notably, LORE’s sampling procedure was based on probability 
sampling (using both telephone and regular mail during the initial recruitment phase), instead 
of self-selected recruitment. From LORE’s pool of probability-recruited participants, a sample 
of 3,397 respondents (stratified on gender, age, education and political interest) was drawn.  
2,291 respondents participated in wave 1 (67%), which was fielded March 22-April 16, 2018. 
1,880 respondents participated in wave 2 (59%), fielded in December 10-January 8, 2018/2019, 
and 1,819 in wave 3 (63%), fielded in October 7-October 28, 2019. 1,508 respondents 
participated in all three waves  (Martinsson et al., 2020).  
  
Analytically, the panel structure allows for several powerful modelling strategies (Shehata et 
al., 2020). In order to analyse the causal and reciprocal effects between media usage and belief 
polarization in men and women, this study relies on structural equation modelling (SEM) as its 
panel analytic method. By using SEM, it is possible to account for a fundamental criterion for 
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valid causal inference, namely assess the direction of, or the potentially reciprocal, influences 
between media use and belief polarization. However, SEM is not the same as causal modelling, 
as causality foremost relates to research design, rather than data modelling (Sturgis, 2016). 
  
In the first step, a descriptive analysis is executed, targeting RQ3a. By examining measures of 
mean and variance, the study answers (1) if societal perceptions among the public are becoming 
more dispersed and (2) if men and women are becoming more different in their perceptions of 
society. Secondly, a mediation analysis is conducted using a path model via SEM to answer 
RQ3b and H2a. In the path model gender is the key independent variable, predicting different 
media usage, interpersonal communication, and finally perception towards the three different 
issues. To answer research question 1, 2, 4 and 5, and hypotheses 1 and 3, the study 
estimates cross-lagged panel models (CLPM) using SEM in order to assess whether the effects 
run from media use to issue perception (media effects), from issue perception to news media 
use (selection effects), or whether there are mutual influences between media use and 
engagement (reciprocal effects). These autoregressive models provide estimates both of the 
stability of media use and issue perception between waves, as well as how lagged values of 
each effect change in the other over time (Acock, 2013; Finkel, 2008). In these analyses, gender 
is modelled as a moderating variable by applying group comparisons. If the correlation is indeed 
stronger among men than women, this speaks for gender as a conditional factor in terms of 
polarization tendencies through reinforcing spirals processes.  By comparing these different 
models, it is possible to assess both the direction of influences between media consumption use 
and issue perception, as well as to provide a substantially stronger test of socialisation and 
gender effects by controlling for stable unit-level heterogeneity. 
 
3.2 Key variables 
The key concepts measured in this thesis – societal issue perceptions as well as two distinct 
forms of media usage – were operationalised using multiple survey items identical across the 
three waves. The same holds true for the operationalisation of interpersonal communication.  
 
3.2.2 Issue perception 
Respondents’ perceptions of the nature and causes of crime, climate change and immigration 
and integration were measured using a battery of factual agree-disagree statements. The mean 
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and variance in the response rates are then used to assess polarization levels. Between four and 
five items are used on each issue. All responses are registered on a five-point scale ranging 
from 1 (Not true at all) to 5 (Completely true), along with a separate “Don’t know” option. 
“Don’t know”-responses are not incorporated in any of the analyses.  
 
Before constructing the indexes, three principal component analyses (PCA) were conducted. 
The PCA is a factor analysis approach and is conducted to assert that the items used in the index 
are unidimensional. What the PCA does is examining how many “underlying” factors are 
required to represent data. When analysing the results, attention is paid to the eigenvalue, which 
is how much of the total variance over all the items is explained by the first factor. To avoid 
subjective or arbitrary criteria for factor or component analysis, several methods have been 
developed, allowing scholars to determine an appropriate range of solutions to investigate. This 
thesis followed Kaisers criterion, which states that all components with eigenvalues under 1.0 
should be dropped. If only one factor has an eigenvalue greater than 1.0, it means that one 
underlying factor can explain correlations between the items of interest in an adequate way. In 
other words, the correlations between the items in the analysis are strong enough to argue that 
they all measure the same underlying dimension (in this case, climate 
change/crime/immigration perception) (Acock, 2013). After some modifications (demonstrated 
below) findings from the PCAs revealed a clear unidimensional structure within all three issues. 
Therefore, three indexes, tapping perceptions toward each issue (based on the items related to 
that issue) were created.  
 
Lastly, Cronbach’s alpha was used to measure the reliability of the measures. Cronbach’s alpha 
is the most commonly reported measure of internal consistency and it ranges from 0 to 1. 
Usually, a coefficient of 0.7 or greater is considered satisfactory. As an example, a coefficient 
of 0.8 would mean that 80 percent of the scale is reliable or, alternatively, 20 percent of the 
variance is due to error (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017). 
  
Immigration beliefs: In total, four items are used, focusing on descriptive beliefs, following 
from the overall question: “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on 
integration and immigration. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?”. 
These are the four items covering descriptive beliefs: (1) Problems related to integration of 
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immigrants into Swedish society have increased during the past decade, (2) Integration of 
immigrants into the Swedish society have improved since the 1960s, (3) Integration of 
immigrants is more successful in Sweden than our neighbouring countries, as well as, (4) The 
issue of integration of immigrants is often exaggerated in the public discourse. 
 
To fit the PCA, the first statement was recoded so that the scale ranged from 1 (Completely 
true) to 5 (Not true at all). As the PCA analyses the correlation matrix where each item is 
standardised to have a variance of 1.0, the eigenvalues combined will add up to 4 (since the 
index consists of 4 items). The first factor in the PCA is 2.55. This means that the first factor 
explains 2.55 out of 4, or it is possible to say that it explains 64% of the variance in the set of 
items. The scale that originally ranged from 1 to 20, was recoded so that it ranged from 1 to 6. 
(Wave 1: PCA factor 1=2.55, Cronbach’s alpha=0.79, M=4.86, SD=1.21). 
  
Crime rates beliefs: Similar to the procedure presented above, four items are used focusing on 
descriptive beliefs, following from the overall question: “Different claims are sometimes heard 
in public discourse on crime of violence and criminality. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements?” (1) During the past years, crime(s) of violence have increased, (2) 
Crimes of violence have decreased in Sweden since the 1950s, (3) More violent crimes per 
inhabitant are committed in Sweden than in our neighbouring countries, as well as, (4) The 
issue of violent crimes is often exaggerated in the public discourse. The first and the third 
statement were recoded so that the scales ranged from 1 (Completely true) to 5 (Not true at all) 
in order to fit the PCA. The scale that originally ranged from 1 to 20, was recoded so that it 
ranged from 1 to 6. (Wave 1: PCA factor 1=2.76, Cronbach’s alpha=0.85, M= 4.04, SD=1.59). 
  
Climate change beliefs: Respondents’ perceptions of the nature and causes of climate change 
are measured using one battery of factual agree-disagree statements. In total, five items are used 
focusing on descriptive beliefs, following from the overall question: “Different claims are 
sometimes heard in public discourse on climate change. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements?”. The five statements were: (1) Global average temperatures have 
increased in the past 100 years, (2) Scientists disagree on whether climate change is taking 
place, (3) Droughts, heavy storms and floods become worse due to climate change, (4) Sweden 
won’t be affected by climate change the next decades, as well as (5) The issue of climate change 
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is often exaggerated in the public discourse. The second, fourth and fifth statement were 
recoded so that the scales ranged from 1 (Completely true) to 5 (Not true at all) in order to fit 
the PCA. The scale that originally ranged from 1 to 25, was recoded so that it ranged from 1 to 
6. (Wave 1: PCA factor 1=2.57, Cronbach’s alpha=0.72, M=5.08, SD=1.02). 
  
3.2.3 Defining gender  
When defining gender, it is not necessarily meaningful to assess gender as a continuous 
variable, even though levels of femininity and masculinity doubtlessly exist. Results from 
advertising processing research are generally alike, whether gender is operationalized as a 
continuous or binary construct (Wolin & Korgaonkar, 2003). In this study, thus, gender is 
operationalised as a binary construct (male or female) and is termed “gender” instead of “sex” 
since gender is considered both a sociological and biological process (Babin & Boles, 1998).  
 
The panel study asked respondents to identify their gender. 1,172 respondents identified as 
female (51%), and 1,119 respondents identified as male (49%). Gender was dummy-coded for 
the path analyses such that “male” was coded as 1 and “female” was coded as 0. In the cross-
lagged model, multiple group comparison is utilized to estimate gender's effect as a moderating 
variable. This way, gender takes the role of a categorical moderator, and is thus assumed to 
moderate the relationship between selective exposure and media effects.  
 
3.2.4 Media usage  
To examine how people's media usage may affect their issue perception, this thesis is focusing 
on the differences between alternative media consumption and mainstream media consumption.  
  
Alternative media: Participants’ usage of alternative news media is captured based on a set of 
items covering their general inclination to seek online news providing alternative perspectives 
actively. Four items were used, asking, “How often do you use online news websites or social 
media to follow...” (1) News about societal issues not reported by the traditional media, (2) 
News that provide an alternative view on societal issues than traditional media (3) News that 
target societal issues the way I see them, as well as (4) News that provide new perspectives on 
important societal issues. These items were combined with three additional items on issue-
specific alternative media usage: “How often do you use online news websites or social media 
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to follow news that provides an alternative view than the traditional media on the following 
topics?”. The items that followed were (5) News about crime, (6) News about the climate and 
environment, as well as (7) News about integration and immigration. Response categories on 
these seven items ranged from 1 (Daily) to 6 (Never), but was reversed so that the scales range 
from 1 (Never) to 6 (Daily). A PCA showed that only one factor had an eigenvalue greater than 
1.0. Hence, the items were added into an overall usage of alternative media index. (Wave 1: 
PCA factor 1=4.59, Cronbach’s alpha=0.89, M = 2.82, SD = 1.39).  
 
Mainstream media: Participants’ usage of mainstream news media is likewise captured based 
on a set of items covering their general inclination to actively seek news (online or traditional 
channels) for a list of specific outlets, namely: Sveriges Radio (SR), Sveriges Television (SVT), 
TV4 Nyheterna, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet, Aftonbladet, Expressen, Göteborgs-
Posten and “Other local newspaper”, as recommended (Andersen, et al., 2016). Similar to the 
items capturing alternative media consumption, response categories ranged from 1 (“Daily”) to 
6 (“Never”) (reversed). Subsequently, items were added into an overall usage of mainstream 
media index (Wave 1: Cronbach’s alpha=0.58,  M=2.92, SD=1.00).  
 
3.2.5 Interpersonal Communication 
Following the general theories of sociotropic belief formation and reinforcing spirals as 
outlined in the background section, accounting for alternative sources of information is 
essential. Issue-specific interpersonal communication is included in the cross-lagged path 
model to rule-out men’s and women's everyday talk about these issues with friends and family 
as a driver of belief formation. In the path analysis, in which the question if men's and women's 
media usage can explain their perceptions of society is examined, interpersonal communication 
is included as a mediating variable.  
 
People’s inclination of discussing societal issues with friends and family was captured based 
on a set of items covering issue-specific communication practices, namely: “How often do you 
discuss criminality and crime rates with family or friends?” (Wave 1: M = 3.75, SD = 1.24), 
“How often do you discuss environmental- and climate issues with family or friends?” (Wave 
1: M = 3.85, SD = 1.13), and “How often do you discuss integration and immigration with 
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family or friends?” (Wave 1: M = 3.95, SD = 1.21). Response categories on these items ranged 
from 1 (Daily) to 6 (Never) but were reversed.    
  
3.2.6 Control variables  
In addition, a set of control variables are employed to control for possible composition effects 
or spurious or intervening effects. Following control variables are chosen because they have 
been shown to correlate with an individual’s media diet and/or polarization level (Dvir 
Gvirsman, 2014; Dahlgren et al., 2019).  
 
Interest in politics is measured by the question: “How interested are you generally in politics?” 
The response alternatives ranged from 1 = Not at all interested, to 5 = Very interested. (Wave 
1: M = 2.90, SD = 0.69). 
 
Partisan or ideological differences are captured by including political ideology (left-right 
placement) as a control variable. The response alternatives ranged from 1 = Very left-
leaning, to 10 = Very right-leaning (Wave 1: M = 4.97, SD = 2.23). 
 
These control variables are also chosen since they tap into the social identity spectra, and thus 
can control for gender differences particularly. Furthermore, age and educational level are 
accounted for as socio-demographic control variables. Age was coded into six categories: 1 = 
Below 30 y/o, 2 = 30-39 y/o, 3 = 40-49 y/o, 4 = 50-59 y/o, 5 = 60-69 y/o and 6 = 70 y/o or 
older. There were nine response alternatives for education, ranging from 1 = Not finished 
elementary school, to 9 = Finished doctoral studies.  
 
While the argumentation presented in the theory section may correspond to treating ideology 
and political interest as mediating variables in the analysis, which is also the most common 
strategy among studies examining gender effects, this study will instead treat these subfactors 
as control variables. This decision is based on two prospects: (1) the principal aim of this study 
is to examine gender differences related to media usage and media-driven belief polarization – 
not necessarily what these differences constitute, and (2) by controlling for ideology and 
political interest, it is possible to observe if a relationship between gender and issue perception 
36 
remains after the analysis, which in such case would mean that potential gender differences 
could not be explained by ideology or political interest.   
 
In the case of the cross-lagged panel models, the same variables are controlled for, although 
some scholars argue the need to control for many stable factors disappears when using a cross-
lagged panel. Dahlgren et al. (2019), for instance, stress that lagged dependent variables serve 
as “catch-all” proxies for unmeasured omitted variables at each wave of the panel. Compared 
to regression models on cross-sectional data, CLPM thus provides a more robust set of controls 
(p 166). It can, however, be of value to add some more unstable control variables since these 
variables merely work as ‘catch-all controls’ up until the prior panel wave (Dahlgren et al., 
2019). To what degree people participate in interpersonal communication with friends and 
family about a societal problem such as immigration, crime or climate change could, for 
instance, be a factor that may change between waves. Consequently, interest in politics and 
political ideology are – despite their stable characteristics – controlled for in the models in order 
to exclusively capture if and how effects between media usage, IPC and issue perception are 
conditioned by gender. This thesis now moves on to describe its key statistical techniques.  
  
3.3 Descriptive analysis – polarization   
Issue perception is a crucial focal variable in the model, measured in order to assess polarization 
patterns. There are several ways to both define and operationalize polarization (DiMaggio et 
al., 1996). Studies of intergroup agreement/disagreement often inspect the difference in means 
as measurement, which this thesis will adhere to as well, in order to see if differences between 
men and women have become greater or smaller over time. However, this measure suppresses 
information relevant to understanding intergroup differences. For instance, focusing on mean 
reveals nothing about the shape of the distribution. Public perceptions on an issue can also be 
characterized as polarized to the extent that perceptions are varied, and moderately balanced 
between ends of the perception spectrum. Polarization is thus closely linked to dispersion too. 
The variance is the natural measure of opinion spread, with polarization entailing increased 
variance over time. It signifies the degree to which any two randomly selected respondents are 
expected to differ in their opinions and is affected by the proportion of extreme responses. 
Accordingly, variance increases when perceptions become more polarized (DiMaggio, et al., 
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1996). Examining polarization patterns within issue perceptions, it is therefore mean and 
variance that are studied.  
 
DiMaggio et al. (1996) furthermore argue polarization entails the degree to which perceptions 
cluster around two opposing positions with few moderate perceptions in between (increased 
bimodality, measured by kurtosis) and the existence of systematic differences between groups 
(increased belief constraint, also referred to as “identity-based polarization”, measured by 
alpha). While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to take all these measurements into 
consideration, by studying the distribution of issue perceptions in a graph or histogram, it is 
largely feasible to confirm whether perceptions are clustering around opposing positions or not. 
Moreover, patterns of identity-based polarization may be traced indirectly through the cross-
lagged models by comparing how the effect of ideology and political interest differ among men 
and women on sociotropic belief formation. The overriding downside with, not only these 
measures, but the entire polarization concept, is the lack of threshold values. While 
interpretation ought to be guided by theory, it will to a certain extent always be arbitrary.  
 
3.4 SEM   
To be able to answer if selection effects and media effects differ between men and women, and 
ultimately if one of the two is more likely to polarize, structural equation modelling (SEM) was 
used. The benefit of SEM is that “[I]t allows one to estimate the relationship between a number 
of independent variables and more than one dependent variable at the same time” (Mehmetoglu 
& Jakobsen, 2017, p. 294), in contrast to traditional techniques such as regression analysis. In 
SEM value is estimated through path coefficients, which indicates the direct effect of a variable 
assumed to be a cause on another variable assumed to be an effect. Path coefficients are 
standardised because they are estimated from correlations (Acock, 2013).  
 
3.4.1 Path analysis  
Path analysis is a statistical technique and a type of the general linear model that examines the 
impact of a set of predictor variables on multiple dependent variables (Allen, 2017). While OLS 
models yields the direct effect of predictors, path analysis may be used to estimate the indirect 
effect of a cause on an effect by multiplying the direct effects along the paths from the beginning 
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to the end of a causal chain of variables (Sturgis, 2016). Indirect effects of antecedent variables 
(i.e., variables that influence other variables, in this case, gender) on a consequent variable (i.e., 
a variable that is influenced by other variables, in this case, issue perception) can be summed 
to determine the total effects on that criterion variable. Variables that function as both 
antecedents and consequents, such as media consumption and interpersonal communication, 
are mediating variables. Ultimately, a proposed structure that describes the causal flow from 
antecedent to consequent variables is typically constructed. Figure 2, below, represents the 
structure proposed to answer RQ3 and H2.  
 
Figure 2. An outline for the proposed path model of gender’s effect on belief polarization 
 
 
 
Note. The proposed path model controls for a range of sociodemographic variables, such 
as age and education. 
  
In order to disentangle the direct, indirect, and total effects of gender on issue perception (and 
in an extension media-driven belief polarization) among citizens, SEM is used to estimate a 
path analysis. Based on the theoretical reasoning aloft, the predictor of people’s polarized 
perceptions is gender. The primary purpose of this model is to assess whether the effects of 
gender documented previously are mediated by media usage and interpersonal communication. 
That is, does gender influence issue perception by affecting an individual’s news media 
consumption and tendency of discussing such issues, or are gender effects mediated by some 
other mechanism? Therefore, two variables of different kinds of news media consumption are 
included as mediating variables in the causal model, expected to be influenced by gender, as 
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well as to exert a direct impact on issue perception. Similarly, interpersonal communication is 
believed to function as a mediating factor in such a way that perceptions on societal issues 
develop in relation to communicative practices within people’s social networks. Considering 
findings of prior research, men should be involved in more interpersonal communication, while 
women, on the other hand, may be more susceptible to influence through such communication 
practices. In addition, media consumption is expected to a have a positive effect on 
interpersonal communication, in such way that people who consume alternative and/or 
mainstream media will be more likely to discuss societal issues with friends and family. 
 
3.4.2 Cross-lagged panel analysis and group comparisons 
This thesis now moves on to examine if the relationship between media usage and sociotropic 
beliefs are characterized by mutually reinforcing spirals, and whether these reinforcement 
processes are moderated by gender (RQ4, H3), and to explore if these reinforcement processes 
are universal or issue specific (RQ5). To do this, cross-lagged structural equation models will 
be conducted.  
  
Cross-lagged panel models, CLPM, (also called cross-lagged panel analysis or cross-lagged 
regression models) estimate the directional influence variables have on each other over time 
and is thus an analytical strategy used to describe reciprocal relationships. Cross-lagged path 
models compare cross-lagged relationships. More than allowing for the estimation of cross-
lagged effects, they also control for correlations within time points and autoregressive effects, 
or stability, across time. Autoregressive effects, then, represent the amount of stability in 
constructs over time. While smaller autoregressive coefficients (closer to zero) indicate more 
variance in the construct (denoting less stability or influence from the previous time point), 
larger autoregressive coefficients indicate little variance over time (denoting more stability or 
influence from the previous time point). Because the stability of the constructs is controlled for, 
it is generally believed that the cross-lagged regression parameters attained through the model 
are the most appropriate measures for examining causality in longitudinal correlational data. 
Cross-lagged coefficients are usually standardised in order to compare their relative strength to 
determine which variables have the most substantial influence (Hamaker, 2015). 
 
40 
The cross-lagged panel model used in this thesis consists of three X variables (x1, x2, x3) 
representing media usage, three Y variables (y1, y2, y3) representing issue perception, and 
three Z variables (z1, z2, z3) representing interpersonal communication. The model also 
consists of parameters, including cross-lagged paths β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8 and 
autoregressive paths β9, β10, β11, β12, β13, β14 (Allen, 2017).  
 
Figure 3. Three-wave Cross-lagged Panel Model 
 
 
Note. In this model, β1 represents the cross-lagged effects from X1 on Y2 and β2 
from Y1 on X2.  
 
When fitting a path model, as demonstrated aloft, it is common to include a categorical variable 
as a predictor (Acock, 2013). In the case of this study, the categorical variable gender is the 
predictor of the endogenous variables (alternative and mainstream media consumption). This 
adds the gender effect, if any, to the estimated score on the outcome variable (issue perception). 
However, the CLPMs will be assessed using group comparisons, which differs from the 
approach used in the path analysis (Acock, 2013). For instance, it is feasible to expect, as 
mentioned in the theory chapter, that the effects of other exogenous variables vary by gender. 
For instance, the effect of interpersonal communication on issue perception may be different 
for women than it is for men. A path model in which gender functions as an exogenous variable 
is not able to handle this, and it is therefore necessary to allow for the interaction of gender with 
interpersonal communication. This means that the effect of interpersonal communication on 
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issue perception is moderated by gender. Similarly, there is a believed interaction between 
gender and media usage and issue perception. The effect of media usage on issue perception 
(or vice versa, following the RSM), is ultimately contingent on the level of the third variable, 
female. 
 
3.4.2.1 Model fit 
Next follows an assessment of the goodness-of-fit of the models (Kaplan, 2008), i.e. 
interpretation of the model. There are several approaches to assessing fit, for instance: chi-
square test (χ2 ), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI). Chi-square test is a function of the sample size and the difference between the observed 
covariance matrix and the model covariance matrix. For this test to show a good fit, the p-value 
should be above 0.05. However, χ 2 tests have been found sensitive to large sample sizes, 
making other tests more appropriate (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017). The second test, CFI, 
compares the hypothesised model with the baseline fit that assumes there are no relationships 
among the variables or, in other words, the poorest fit instead of the perfect fit. It largely 
depends on the average size of the correlations in the data. A CFI value of .95 or higher is 
desirable (Acock, 2013). The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), is based on 
the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom and considers sample size and model complexity 
when assessing the fit as it favours simple models with few parameters (Allen, 2017). RMSEA 
ranges from zero to one, where a value of .05 reflects excellent fit, .06 very good fit, .07 good 
fit, and .08 acceptable fit. Is the model proves a RMSEA value of .09 and beyond, it ought to 
be considered a poorly fitting model. 
 
In Table 1, 2 and 3 the test results of the original, unadjusted path and cross-lagged models are 
displayed. None of the results is considered acceptable. The command "estat mindices" helps 
to improve the model fit by providing an overview of which paths the software recommend 
adding to improve the fit, so-called modification indices. When assessing modification  indices, 
one should look for high numbers and paths that are theoretically justifiable (Mehmetoglu & 
Jakobsen, 2017). In the path analyses, a path between gender and issue perception is identified. 
More than improving the fit of the model, it also provides the opportunity to examine whether 
gender indeed has a direct effect on issue perception. However, since the model is saturated 
(that is, the model reproduces data perfectly because all variables are allowed to correlate with 
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each other), the model fit cannot be calculated. In all the cross-lagged models, two reasonable 
paths are identified, namely a path between selective media exposure in wave 1 to selective 
media exposure in wave 3 and a path between selective media exposure to interpersonal 
communication. In Table 3 and 4, the models have been adjusted by adding these paths, and the 
model fit has thus substantially improved. While the χ2-test is still significant, which is not 
ideal, this test is as aforementioned vastly sensitive to large sample sizes. Hence, most attention 
should be paid to the other two tests. As shown in the tables, both RMSEA and CFI display 
values that are, if not good, acceptable. 
 
Table 1. Goodness of fit, path model  
 
 Note. The unadjusted model only includes the three key variables, namely: the media 
variable, issue perception and interpersonal communication, where gender has no direct 
effect on issue perception and IPC is modelled as an endogenous mediating variable. The 
second model is estimated with a direct path between gender and issue perception. 
However, model fit cannot be calculated since the model is saturated. The model controls 
for political interest, ideology, age and education.  
 
 
  
  
 
Model 1 (original) 
 
 Model 2(adjusted)  
 
Climate Crime Immigration Climate Crime Immigration 
χ 2 (df) 56.36 56.66 77.37 . . . 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
RMSEA 0.109 0.109 
 
0.128 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
CFI 0.844 0.928 
 
0.862 1.000 1.000 
 
1.000 
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Table 2. Goodness of fit, cross-lagged model: traditional media  
 
Note. The unadjusted model only includes the three key variables, namely: the media 
variable, issue perception and interpersonal communication, modelled according to the 
original RSM. The second model is estimated with a path between selective media 
exposure in wave 1 to selective media exposure in wave 3 and a path between selective 
media exposure to interpersonal communication to improve model fit. The model controls 
for political interest, ideology, age and education.  
 
 
Table 3. Goodness of fit, cross-lagged model: alternative media  
 
 Note. The unadjusted model only includes the three key variables, namely: the media 
variable, issue perception and interpersonal communication, modelled according to the 
original RSM. The second model is estimated with a path between selective media 
exposure in wave 1 to selective media exposure in wave 3, a path between issue 
perception in wave 1 to issue perception in wave 3, a path between IPC in wave 1 to IPC in 
wave 3 and a path between selective media exposure to interpersonal communication to 
improve model fit. The model controls for political interest, ideology, age and education.  
 
 
 
Model 1 (original) 
 
 Model 2(adjusted)  
 
Climate Crime Immigration Climate Crime Immigration 
χ 2 (df) 577.76 635.29 686.58 53.46 95.75 71.25 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
RMSEA 0.112 0.118 
 
0.123 0.028 0.046 
 
0.037 
CFI 0.924 0.928 
 
0.907 0.997 0.992 
 
0.994 
 
Model 1 (original) 
 
 Model 2(adjusted)  
 
Climate Crime Immigration Climate Crime Immigration 
χ 2 (df) 568.34 695.31 692.41 89.24 133.73 88.22 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 
RMSEA 0.180 0.148 
 
0.180 0.044 0.057 
 
0.043 
CFI 0.897 0.940 
 
0.882 0.991 0.986 
 
0.991 
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3.5 Validity  
With regards to how well the chosen variables succeed in capturing the concepts of interest, 
several concerns are noteworthy. Firstly, the conceptualization of alternative media poses an 
issue in terms of validity of this thesis. Although media reports find that ideologically right-
leaning alternative media are vastly overrepresented in the Swedish case, it is still not possible 
to distinguish how respondents in the study interpreted “alternative media”, nor estimate how 
many of the respondents with an alternative media orientation actually consume left or right-
leaning alternative media. Hence, the index that measures selective exposure to alternative 
media is unable to capture if right-leaning or left-leaning alternative media have a different 
effect on polarization levels in society. Since vastly different approaches toward the societal 
issues of interest are to be expected from these platforms, it is further possible that effects are 
cancelled out in such way that people who seek out right-leaning alternative media will be 
reinforced in beliefs about an escalating issue with immigration rates. In contrast, people who 
consume left-leaning alternative media may attain reinforced beliefs about a widely closed 
society where immigrants are declined asylum. It may thus seem like the selective exposure 
index targeting alternative media fails to predict if people indeed may be trapped in right versus 
left-leaning alternative media bubbles. However, this issue is attended in the findings section.   
 
Moreover, there are some issues with the index targeting to measure polarization levels. To 
begin with, each index only consists of four to five items. This set of items undoubtedly 
provides an indication of a person’s perception of reality but may not be able to assess how 
extreme perceptions a person truly possesses, as the items do not capture the full spectra of 
complexity surrounding each of the issues. Secondly, the items were recoded in such way that 
the option "Don't know" was reported as missing. This may pose an issue towards validity as 
important nuances of respondents self-assessed level of knowledge gets lost. Looking at the 
response rate on immigration perception, for instance, N is remarkably lower for women than 
for men (N, women: 681; N, men: 804). Most likely, this means that women are more prone to 
choose the "Don't know"-option. However, it remains unknown if this is due to lower “issue 
knowledge”, or if it could be explained through theories of risk aversion, which principally 
implies that women are less likely to guess on questions for which they are uncertain (Lizotte 
& Sidman, 2009). It is further unknown if this tendency may have something to do with their 
media consumption. If this is indeed the case, it is something which ought to be examined 
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closer. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer such questions, though they 
should still be considered.   
 
Another variable that poses a concern towards validity is that of interpersonal communication. 
As much of the literature pool on interpersonal communication target effects within 
homogeneous versus heterogenous social networks, and how dissonant messages are responded 
to within such networks, the posed hypothesis are built mainly on the assumption that 
respondents foremost belong to homogenous social networks in which media messages are 
reinforced or strengthened, rather than altered. Previous research also indicates that close-tie 
interpersonal communication often is homogenous (Katz & Lazarfeld, 1955; Schmitt-Beck, 
2003). However, it is not possible to say that this is indeed the case, and similar to the issue of 
alternative media, it could be that discussion within homogenous and heterogenous social 
networks cancelled each other out. Besides, as the chosen research design only assess group 
changes, it is impossible to examine individual effects – both related to media effects and 
selective exposure, but  also interpersonal communication processes.  
 
Finally, some validity-issues arise on account of the cross-lagged panel analyses. Cross-lagged 
panel models assume that the influence of one variable on another is a function of lag, or time 
between waves of measurement. To have meaningful interpretations, the amount of lag must 
be contextually appropriate, something which may pose difficulties in terms of data gathering 
as the RSM lacks theoretical guidelines in what constitutes an appropriate lag. While the effects 
will dissipate before the next time of measurement if the lag is too long, measurement will occur 
before the effects can be observed if the lag is too short (Allen, 2017). Whether the amount of 
lag in this study was contextually appropriate is impossible to establish without comparison. 
However, with regards to the findings presented in the following section, it would appear as if 
the time between the waves of measurement was adequate. 
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4 Results 
The analysis begins with a descriptive statistic section in which the overall perceptions towards 
the three issues in the study are examined coupled with respondents’ media habits. This is 
followed by an analysis of the divergencies between men’s and women’s perceptions to answer 
RQ1. To answer RQ2 and RQ3 and test H2, a series of path models using structural equation 
modelling was estimated (Acock, 2013). To make full use of the data and investigate reciprocal 
influences between sociotropic beliefs and media use (RQ4 and RQ5, and H3), cross-lagged 
structural equation models were conducted.  
  
4.1 Part 1: Identifying the gap  
Before analysing the SEM results, what can be concluded regarding media use is that men, as 
predicted, in general seek out more news media than do women. When examining both the 
mainstream media index and the alternative media index, male respondents turn to both 
mainstream and alternative media platforms for news more often than do women and thus have 
a slightly higher mean (see Appendix 4). However, when examining all media items 
individually, results show that women consume news from SVT to a slightly higher degree than 
men. In all items covering alternative media consumption, men display higher levels of 
consumption. However, while women most often use alternative online news websites or social 
media to receive an alternative view on the topic of climate change, men most often turn to 
alternative media for news about criminality (men: M = 3.05, SD = 1.45, women: M = 2.59, 
SD = 1.29). During the course of the study, the level of media consumption was overall stable. 
The descriptive data, nevertheless, suggests small a decrease in alternative media consumption 
among women and a small increase among men.  
 
Appendix 4 displays the degree of belief divergence to the three societal issues of interest 
throughout the panel study. The level of perception conviction among the population varies, yet 
not massively, between the specific issues. Out of the three issues, climate change is the issue 
that causes the least belief divergence. While a striking majority of the participants 
demonstrated very critical perceptions of climate change development in wave 1 (M = 5.08), 
this unity grew even stronger in the second wave (M = 5.15). Correspondingly, variance did 
not demonstrate values indicating any belief separation during the period (1.03 < v < 1.28). The 
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issue of crime development displayed an overall lower unity among the respondents. 
Throughout the study, however, the mean rose and the variance dropped, indicating that the 
issue is becoming less polarized. Similarly, the perceptions of immigration in Swedish society 
are (marginally) more diverse (M = 4.86, V = 1.47) than the issue of climate change. Albeit 
small changes in values, it is still interesting to note that during the three waves, critical 
perceptions toward the issue of immigration increases, while belief differences decline.  
 
4.1.1 Gender differences     
This thesis will now move on to explore change over time in variance and mean on the same 
scales and items for men and women. In order to conserve space, results are presented primarily 
when they differ the sample as a whole.  
 
To test the hypotheses concerning whether men and women have a different population mean 
for the perception variables, Mann-Whitney U Tests were conducted. These tests are used to 
describe the null hypothesis – which is the opposite of what this thesis is expecting. Results 
from these tests showed a significant difference in perception to all issues between men and 
women (p = .000-.007), which means that the null hypothesis can be rejected.   
 
With regards to the issue of immigration, male participants depict a more negative perception 
of the current situation than women. 48 percent of the men indicated negative perceptions 
related to immigration, while only 31 percent of the women agreed (men: M = 5.03, women: 
M = 4.65). In general, though, signs of polarization – both within and between groups – are 
absent in the data. Instead, the public attains a more congenial perception of the issue 
throughout the study. Women indicate a slightly more concerned perception, while men become 
somewhat less. Figure 7, below, displays the difference in perceptions of crime between male 
and female respondents in wave 1. 
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Figure 4. Gender Differences in Immigration Perceptions: Index Descriptive Statements, Wave 1 
  
 
  
Notes: The questions were, “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on integration and 
immigration. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1) Problems related to integration of 
immigrants into Swedish society have increased during the past decade, (2) Integration of immigrants into the 
Swedish society have improved since the 1960s, (3) Integration of immigrants is more successful in Sweden 
than our neighbouring countries and (4) The issue of integration of immigrants is often exaggerated in the 
public discourse." M = 4.86, SD = 1.21, Variance = 1.47, N = 1,485. 
 
 
Among male respondents the most common answer to the descriptive questions covering the 
issue of crime was “strongly agree”, indicating a critical assessment of the issue of crime in 
Swedish society (27 percent, female 21 percent). While a reasonably high variance value would 
suggest that the issue may be subject of polarization, this does not seem to be the case. One of 
the biggest concerns related to polarization, as stated above, is that people with different 
perceptions on an issue may cluster into separate camps with locations between the two 
positions sparsely occupied, since the extent to which belief variation leads to conflict is likely 
to depend on the extent to which occupants of polar stances are isolated from one another. If 
there are people with “middle positions”, these actors may broker between extremes, which 
Figure 8 clearly shows there is. 
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Figure 5. Gender Differences in Crime Perceptions: Index Descriptive Statements, Wave 1 
  
 
  
Note: The questions were, “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on crime of violence and 
criminality. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?” (1) During the past years, crime(s) of 
violence have increased, (2) Crimes of violence have decreased in Sweden since the 1950s, (3) More violent 
crimes per inhabitant are committed in Sweden than in our neighbouring countries and (4) The issue of violent 
crimes is often exaggerated in the public discourse." M = 4.04, SD = 1.59, Variance = 2.52, N = 1,407. 
 
The issue that initially caused the least difference in perception between male and female 
participants was that of climate change. Only five people (2 women and 3 men) displayed 
hesitation towards the fact that climate change is a critical issue in wave 1 (men: M = 5.01, 
women: M = 5.15). However, these figures would alter somewhat during the study. While both 
men and women indicated very negative perceptions related to climate change in the second 
wave, these perceptions of concerned declined in the final wave, leading to increased variance. 
Ultimately, even though perceptions of climate change at large is not an issue where men and 
women diverge (neither within nor between groups), it is still the societal issue which at present 
displays figures implying a growing gap in perception. The difference in perceptions toward 
climate change between men and women in wave 1 is displayed in Figure 9. 
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Figure 6. Gender Differences in Climate Change Perceptions: Index Descriptive Statements,  
Wave 1 
 
  
Notes: The questions were, “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on climate change. To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1) Global average temperatures have increased in 
the past 100 years, (2) Scientists disagree on whether climate change is taking place, (3) Droughts, heavy 
storms and floods become worse due to climate change, (4) Sweden won’t be affected by climate change the 
next decades and (5) The issue of climate change is often exaggerated in the public discourse." M = 5.09, SD = 
1.02, Variance = 1.04, N = 1,948. 
 
Taken together, these descriptive analyses suggest that sociotropic beliefs differ between men 
and women, lending support for H1. While men are more inclined to display critical 
assessments of crime and immigration developments, women are more prone to exhibit 
negative perceptions toward the issue of climate change. Over the course of the panel-study, 
however, perceptions among men and women converged on two out of three issues.  
 
4.2 Part 2: Path Analyses 
As the descriptive analyses found support for a predicted gender gap in sociotropic beliefs, this 
study now moves on to answer RQ3, namely to what extent these differences can be explained 
by media usage and interpersonal communication. Consulting theory, media consumption is 
further believed to have a positive effect on interpersonal communication – which in turn is 
hypothesised to affect perception formation and maintenance. Thus, IPC concerned with the 
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issues of interest is modelled as a mediating variable in the path analyses. Ideology and political 
interest, which in most gender effect studies also are treated as mediating variables, will on the 
other hand be modelled as control variables. By controlling for these subfactors rather than 
examining their mediation effects, as aforementioned, it is possible to see if a relationship 
between gender and issue perception remains after the analysis – which in such case would 
mean that potential gender differences could not be explained by ideology or political interest.  
 
First, an individual path model is constructed for each societal issue. Gender is dummy-coded 
so that 1 = male and 0 = female, meaning that significant coefficients displaying the direct effect 
of gender on media usage and interpersonal communication, is the reversed value for women. 
Due to length restrictions, only models testing for the effect of male will be displayed.   
 
Before examining each societal issue separately, the first section of the path analysis confirms 
a statistically significant difference between women and men on news use. The standardised 
path coefficient of traditional news media for men is β = .07 (z = 1.80, p < 0.001). News on 
alternative media has a standardised path coefficient of β = .17 (z = 4.69, p < 0.001), controlling 
for political interest, ideology, education and age, as shown in Figure 6. Gender, thus, has a 
significant effect on news media usage. These results partly answer RQ2 (How do personal 
news media usage differ between men and women?).  
 
4.2.1 Climate change 
Turning to the effects of each variable on the endogenous outcome variable, issue perception, 
alternative news media use is to begin with found to have a negative, significant effect on 
climate change belief, β = -.21 (z = -9.40, p < 0.001). Owing to the extensive homogeny on the 
issue, this makes alternative media the strongest predictor of possessing less concerned 
perceptions about climate change, controlling for political interest, ideology, age, education and 
interpersonal communication. The total effect for male participants, β = -.0304 (z = -1.39, p > 
0.05), is the effect found if there was no mediator in the model. However, the standardised path 
coefficient, the part of the effect that is not mediated by media consumption or interpersonal 
communication, of male is β = -.0037 (z = -0.17, p > 0.05). This means that: (1) gender has no 
statistically significant direct effect on climate change perception and (2) it is smaller than the 
total effect, which, if the results were significant, would indicate positive mediating effects. In 
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addition, there is also a significant negative indirect effect – the part of the effect that is 
mediated through mainstream news media use, alternative media use and interpersonal 
communication (with a value of β = -.03, z = -4.70, p < 0.001). In other words, this indirect 
effect is the product of the direct effects of gender on media usage, times the direct effects of 
media usage and interpersonal communication on climate change perception. By dividing the 
indirect effect with the total effect, the proportion of the effect which is mediated is obtained. 
In this case, almost 89% of the effect would have been mediated if all effects were significant. 
Continuing, the path model examining climate change explains 16% respectively 11% variance 
in mainstream and alternative media usage, 7% variance in interpersonal communication and 
17% variance in issue perception. 
 
Figure 7. Standardised estimates for men and climate change perceptions 
  
 
 
 
  
Note. N = 2,288; χ 2 = .; p = .000; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = 0.000. The model is estimated with 
correlated residuals and control variables to improve model fit. The model controls for 
political interest, ideology, age and education. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
  
4.2.2 Crime 
This study will now move on to examine if men's and women's media consumption affects their 
views on the issue of crime in society. In this analysis, alternative media makes a robust 
53 
predictor of perceiving the development of criminality in Swedish society as very critical, β = 
.13 (z = 5.62, p < 0.001). The total effect for male participants, -.0321 (z = -1.41, p > 0.05), is 
small and insignificant. Because the total effect is minimal, it is not suitable to divide the 
indirect and the total effect to see how much of the effect that is mediated. However, the 
standardised path coefficient, or the direct effect, for male is β = -.05 (z = -2.30, p < 0.05). It is 
negative and larger than the total effect, which, if both the results were significant, would 
indicate negative mediating effects. Continuing, there is a positive indirect effect through 
mainstream news media use, alternative media use and interpersonal communication (with a 
value of β = .02, z = 2.64, p < 0.01). This means that as a man, controlling for education, age, 
political interest and ideology, you are more likely to have less negative perceptions about the 
issue of crime than women. However, you are also more likely to seek out alternative media 
which, on the other hand, will make you more prone to discuss the issue with friends and family 
– having a substantial effect on issue perception – and make you more likely to form negative 
perceptions about the issue of crime.   
 
In contrast to the descriptive data, which showed that men were more prone to have very 
negative beliefs about crime development, this analysis partly indicates the opposite. While 
men in the original model, without any control variables, are still more likely to perceive the 
issue very critically, this effect alters when adding mediating variables and the control variables. 
What this means, ultimately, is that rather than having firm believes about crime because of 
your gender, you perceive the issue of crime more based on your ideological leaning, political 
interest, age, media usage and how much you talk about the issue with friends and family. 
Moreover, which will be closer examined in the next section, gender may also moderate the 
effect of interpersonal communication, illustrating the complexity of designing and interpreting 
causal models.  Lastly, the path model examining crime perceptions explains more variance in 
usage of mainstream news media, alternative media, interpersonal communication and 
perception than the previous model – 16%, 11%, 19% and 39% respectively.  
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Figure 8. Standardised estimates for men and crime perceptions 
  
 
  
Note. N = 2,288; χ 2 = .; p = .000; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = 0.000. The model is estimated with 
correlated residuals and control variables to improve model fit. The model controls for 
political interest, ideology, age and education. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
4.2.3 Immigration 
Finally, the path analysis for immigration perception demonstrate that alternative media, as 
predicted, indeed influences immigration perception  (β = .05, z = 2.09, p < 0.05). However, the 
effect is small and is nowhere close to the effect of ideology ( β = .39, z = 18.31, p < 0.001), 
demonstrating that a right-leaning ideology is the strongest predictor of perceiving the issue of 
immigration in Sweden with scepticism. The total effect of male participants is β = .09 (z = 
3.72, p < 0.001), while the direct effect is β = .08 (z = 3.53, p < 0.05). This means that 94% of 
the effect of gender on immigration perception is direct (direct effect/total effect). Furthermore, 
the indirect effect is insignificant, β = .01 (z = 1.16, p > 0.05), meaning that there are no 
mediating effects. If the coefficient had been significant, the part of the effect that is mediated 
through mainstream news media use, alternative media use and interpersonal communication 
would have been 6% (indirect effect/total effect). Thus, after controlling for age, education, 
ideology and political interest, the majority of the effect of gender on immigration perception 
is direct. Continuing, the model explains 16% variance in mainstream media use, 11% variance 
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in alternative media, 18% variance in interpersonal communication about immigration and 26% 
variance in immigration perception. 
 
Figure 9. Standardised estimates for men and immigration perceptions 
  
 
  
Note. N = 2,288; χ 2 = .; p = .000; CFI = 1.000; RMSEA = 0.000. The model is estimated with 
correlated residuals and control variables to improve model fit. The model controls for 
political interest, ideology, age and education. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Considering the path models without control variables, however, provide substantially different 
results (see Tables 6, 7 and 8 in Appendices). In the case of climate change, gender has a 
significant total effect on climate change perception (β = -.07, z = -3.18, p = 0.001), and 67% 
of the effect is mediated through media usage and IPC. Gender does also have a significant total 
effect on crime perception (β =.06, z = 2.31, p < 0.05). Finally, while gender is still found to 
have a significant direct effect on immigration perception (β =.12, z = 4.73, p < .001), 22% of 
the total effect (β =.15, z = 6.03, p < .001),  is mediated by media usage and IPC. Taken together, 
there are gendered differences in sociotropic beliefs, and these are bigger for some issues and 
enduring over time. However, when controlling for ideology, political interest, age and 
education, these differences cannot be explained by media usage and interpersonal 
communication, ultimately not lending support for H2.  
 
This comparison is, albeit, just one part of the story. Media usage, issue perceptions and 
interpersonal communication – suggested to drive polarization processes – are expected to 
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affect each other reciprocally. In the next section, this thesis thus explores if reinforcing spirals 
ensue over time and whether they are conditioned by gender. 
4.3 Part 3: Cross Lagged Panel-Analyses 
To answer RQ4, RQ5, H3a and H3b, cross lagged panel-analyses were constructed. In order to 
conserve space, only results with controls will be presented. As the aim of the thesis primarily 
is to examine the polarizing effects of alternative media, most focus will be devoted to these 
results.  
  
In the original models, no cross-lagged effects were modelled between the media use variables 
and interpersonal communication. However, as demonstrated in the theory chapter, prior 
research has demonstrated media effects on interpersonal communication (e.g. Howe & 
Krosnick, 2017) and Stata (through estat mindices) reported this modification indices as an 
omitted path in the fitted model. Thus, a simple path is allowed from the media use variable to 
interpersonal communication. Autoregressive paths between wave 1 and wave 3 were also 
allowed for all key variables (media use, issue perception and IPC), as Stata reported this 
modification indices as an omitted path. 
 
Furthermore, the cross-lagged models will be assessed using group comparisons. The value to 
the left in the figures represents the effect between the endogenous variables, moderated by the 
variable “female”, whereas values to the right represent effects moderated by the variable 
“male”. Models on the aggregate level were also conducted to compare with the moderating 
effects of gender. Due to space restrictions, these findings will only be presented in tables 
comparing the significant effects of the different issues.  
 
Ensuing two sections are structured to mirror H3a and H3b, namely: an aggregate analysis of 
reciprocal relationships between media usage, issue perception and IPC, followed by an 
analysis considering the moderating effects of gender. Each section contains one or two figures 
presenting findings from the main cross-lagged model speaking to the reciprocal relationship 
between alternative media use, issue perception and interpersonal communication over time. 
Apart from the variables displayed in the figures, each equation also controls for age, education, 
ideology and political interest (see Tables 9-14 in Appendices for full models).  
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4.3.1 Reinforcement processes: media usage, issue perception and IPC 
According to H3a, reinforcing spirals is predicted to exist between media usage, issue 
perceptions and interpersonal communication. Data in Figure 13 speaks particularly to this 
hypothesis.  
 
Figure 10. Cross-lagged effects between alternative media use, climate change perception 
and interpersonal communication. Group comparison, female/male (standardised path 
coefficients). 
 
 
 
Note. N = 2,288 estimates are standardised path coefficients. All equations control for age, 
education, ideology and political interest (see full model in Table 8, Appendix).  
 
These findings reveal a pattern of reciprocal effects for alternative media and climate change 
perception. Climate change perception has an increasingly negative effect on alternative media 
use, just like alternative media use has an increasingly negative effect on climate change 
perception, controlling for lagged values of the dependent variables and the other control 
variables. This illustrates that people who are more sceptical towards climate change are more 
likely to seek out alternative media. At the same time, such news exposure also seems to 
influence climate change perception. Using alternative media has reinforcing, negative effects 
on how a person perceives climate change. This pattern lends support to the presence of 
reinforcing spirals over time, whereby perception influences selective news media use, which 
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in turn feeds back into perception. However, no significant reciprocal effects were found for 
mainstream media use and climate change perception. The path coefficients in Figure 13 
furthermore indicate that media effects are somewhat stronger than selective effects (e.g. β  =  
-.17 p < .001/ β  = -.13, p < .001) in the case of climate change.  
 
Overall, the findings from the cross-lagged models suggest a reciprocal relationship between 
alternative media and sociotropic beliefs. Comparing alternative and mainstream media, 
alternative media has stronger and more significant effects on both issue perceptions and IPC. 
Two observations are particularly noteworthy: (1) selection effects are in general stronger than 
media effects with the exception of climate change, and (2) the use of alternative media does 
not have a significant effect on perceptions of crime and immigration developments. When 
adding the control variables to these models, effects are overall low and insignificant.  
 
Moreover, adding interpersonal communication to the cross-lagged models appears as a fruitful 
decision when studying the tables. Even though effects are not as strong as in the mediation 
models, IPC still has an overall significant effect on issue perceptions. Crime perception, 
particularly, has a significant effect on how much people discuss the issue with their friends 
and family. A reversed relationship is also true for women between the first and second wave, 
in which the interpersonal communication has a significant effect on crime perception (β  = .08, 
p < .01), as demonstrated in Figure 15 below.  In addition, alternative media is found to have a 
positive effect on IPC on the issues of crime and immigration. This means that people and 
women in particular, who consume alternative media are more likely to talk discuss the issues 
of crime and immigration with their friends and family. A corresponding relationship is, 
however, not found for climate change.   
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Figure 11. Cross-lagged effects between alternative media use, crime perception and 
interpersonal communication. Group comparison, female/male (standardised path 
coefficients). 
 
Note. N = 2,288 estimates are standardised path coefficients. All equations control for age, 
education, ideology and political interest (see full model in Table 10).  
 
4.3.2 Reinforcement processes: gender differences 
According to H3b, gender would moderate reinforcing spirals between media usage, issue 
perceptions and interpersonal communication. Findings from the cross-lagged analyses support 
this hypothesis. On all three issues, gender had a moderating effect on the RSM-processes. On 
the issue of crime, findings reveal spiralling selection effects for perception on alternative media 
consumption among women (W1-2: β = .11, p < .001/W2-3: β  = .14, p < .001), controlling for 
lagged values of the dependent variables and the other control variables. This means that 
women who perceive the issue of crime in society as critical are more likely to seek out 
alternative media. Such finding also holds true for men between the first and the second wave 
(β  = .13, p < .001). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the autoregressive effect of 
perception significantly increases for both genders between the waves (see Figure 15 above). 
This could potentially indicate that the issue of crime during the second and third wave gained 
priority in the public or/and political agenda. With regards to mainstream media, a small, 
negative effect on crime perception among men is detected (W1-2: β =-.06, p<.05/W2-3: β  = -
.05 , p < .05), meaning that men who seek out mainstream media are slightly less inclined to 
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acquire negative perceptions about criminality. Between the second and third wave, mainstream 
media also has a significant effect on interpersonal communication for both genders. While the 
strongest predictor of possessing negative beliefs among women is a lower level of education, 
a rightist ideology is the strongest predictor among male participants. 
 
In general, the reciprocal influences appear stronger among women than men, and patterns of 
reinforcing effects are particularly indicated among female participants on the issue of 
immigration. Scepticism towards the issue of immigration makes women more inclined to 
discuss the topic with friends and family  (W1-2: β  = .10, p < .001) and seek out alternative 
media between the second and third wave  (β  = .08, p < .01). Similarly, such consumption 
exerts positive effects on interpersonal communication (W1-2: β = .10, p < .01), which in turn 
has significant effect on immigration perception (W1-2: β  = .09, p < .05). However, these 
effects are not spiralling but rather stable throughout the study. The same pattern of influence 
does not hold true for men, except alternative media consumption also exerting a positive effect 
on interpersonal communication, as demonstrated in Figure 17 below. Similar to the path 
analysis, a rightist ideology is the strongest predictor of possessing negative immigration 
perceptions throughout the study for both men and women  (W1-2: β  = .17, p < .001/W1-2: β 
 = .16, p < .001). 
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Figure 12. Cross-lagged effects between alternative media use, immigration perception 
and interpersonal communication. Group comparison, female/male (standardised path 
coefficients). 
 
Note. N = 2,288 estimates are standardised path coefficients. All equations control for age, 
education, ideology and political interest (see full model in Table 10).  
 
In sum, the results answers RQ4 and RQ5. The relationship between media usage and 
sociotropic beliefs are primarily characterized by mutually reinforcing spirals. However, the 
effect of using alternative media on issue perception (media effects) is generally weaker than 
the effect of issue perception on using alternative media (selection effect), as displayed in the 
summarising effect tables below. The findings furthermore imply that such processes are 
conditioned by gender. In the case of immigration, reinforcing spiral processes between IPC 
and issue perception are observed for women, while corresponding processes are observed 
among men on the issue of climate change. 
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Note. Equations control for age, education, ideology and political interest (see full model 
in Table 9, Appendices).  
 
 
Note. Equations control for age, education, ideology and political interest (see full model 
in Table 11, Appendices).  
 
 
Note. Equations control for age, education, ideology and political interest (see full model 
in Table 13, Appendices).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Comparing significant effects on the issue of climate change  
 
Perception 
effects 
Alt media 
effects 
IPC 
effects 
    
Men III II I 
Women II II I 
Aggregate III II I 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Comparing significant effects on the issue of crime 
 
Perception 
effects 
Alt media 
effects 
IPC 
effects 
    
Men III   
Women IIII I I 
Aggregate IIII II I 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Comparing significant effects on the issue of immigration 
 
Perception 
effects 
Alt media 
effects 
IPC 
effects 
    
Men I I  
Women II II I 
Aggregate III II I 
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5 Discussion  
This thesis aimed to examine if the fragmented media environment affects societal processes 
of belief polarization and whether these processes differ between men and women. To examine 
gender dynamics in societal-level issue perception, the study employed theoretical insights 
from the RSM, theories of sociotropic beliefs and studies on gendered differences in opinion 
formation and media use. In the consecutive section, five key findings will be discussed and 
analysed closer. 
   
5.1 No signs of polarization – but gender effects on issue 
perceptions 
Inspired by DiMaggio et al. (1996), this thesis suggested three dimensions of polarization in 
the public: the dispersal of perceptions, the degree to which perceptions cluster around two 
opposing positions with few moderate perceptions in between and lastly “identity-based 
polarization” – referring to the existence of systematic differences between men and women. 
On all dimensions, this study found mostly convergence, not polarization. The data thus provide 
slim evidence of a growing gender gap in belief polarization. Nevertheless, men's and women's 
responses diverged substantially, and a significant effect of gender on immigration perception 
remained even when all mediating factors and control variables were taken into consideration. 
This means that regardless of ideological leaning, political interest, degree of social interaction, 
media consumption, education and age – men and women display diverging perceptions about 
immigration in the Swedish society. This makes the issue distinctly different from the other two 
and raises the question: what is it then that makes men and women different? If consulting 
gender theory, the difference between men’s and women’s perception of immigration, may, for 
instance, be fuelled by women’s greater support for egalitarianism and conceivably 
humanitarianism which, in turn, could arise from differences in basic personality traits, such as 
compassion. However, these traits were supposedly captured by controlling for ideology. Could 
further focus on personality traits explain the difference? Is it related to something biological? 
As mentioned aloft, difference research disciplines usually employ different explanatory 
mechanisms. It is also possible, or rather likely, that the gender gap across the issues does not 
have one common origin. Women’s greater self-rated compassion (conveyed by predominant 
leftist ideology) is unlikely to account for their increasingly negative perception of criminality 
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in society, which is perhaps more likely rooted in women’s stronger sense of physiological 
vulnerability. These are, nonetheless, questions which ought to be considered in future 
research.  
 
5.2 Significant gender differences in media usage 
The second finding which deserves emphasis is how procedures of selective exposure differ 
between men and women. As predicted by previous research, men are considerably more prone 
to turn to alternative media, and this holds even when adding control variables. Whereas women 
are more likely to rely on mainstream media than alternative media for news updates, this study 
shows that men seek out alternative media more often than mainstream media. According to 
the analyses, the typical alternative media consumer is a right-wing male who is politically 
interested, which resembles previous research results (e.g. Digital News Report, 2018; Stroud, 
2011).   While the findings emphasized aloft bring answers to RQ1 (How do sociotropic beliefs 
differ between men and women, and how do these differences develop over time?), the results 
from the path analyses further answers RQ3 (To what extent are gender differences in 
sociotropic beliefs explained by media usage and interpersonal communication?). Studying the 
indirect effect of male and direct effect of alternative media on climate change, immigration 
and crime perception, it appears as if media usage partly explains the gender difference in issue 
perception. Although it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about what alternative 
media constitutes or which messages that are disseminated by these platforms from the data, 
the path analyses illustrate the presence of systematic patterns of ideological news selection in 
such way that right-leaning people are more prone to seek out alternative media. This is an 
indication that these platforms and their media content indeed may be politically biased. 
Similarly, alternative media consumption displays a negative effect on climate change 
perception and positive effects on crime and immigration perception, which fits with the 
stereotypical far-right perspective of these issues. Finally, even though alternative media users 
seemingly are developing more critical perceptions of several societal issues – it is mostly in 
conformity with the rest of the public.  
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5.3 Interpersonal communication – stronger effect on women 
Continuing with H2b, this hypothesis predicted that gendered differences in sociotropic beliefs 
are explained by a disparity in interpersonal communication. While this hypothesis was not 
supported, findings did yet suggest that sociotropic beliefs develop in relation to communicative 
practices within people’s social networks. Firstly, issue perceptions, as projected, were found 
to have reciprocal effects on interpersonal communication in both the path analyses and the 
cross-lagged panel models. Even though academia has gradually acknowledged that 
interpersonal discussion may have interactive consequences on the impact of media exposure, 
the theoretical integration and empirical validation of interpersonal communication into mass 
media effects are still modest. This thesis empirically yet validates the notion that high levels 
of interpersonal communication amplify the selected media effect, though it seemingly 
diminishes the effect of alternative media in the context of climate change. It, therefore, appears 
to serve as a social “linchpin” upon which alternative media exposure is evaluated.  
 
Secondly, prior studies have found that people who believe their opinions are out of step with 
those of the perceived majority are reluctant to voice such opinions (Glynn & Park, 1997). Such 
finding is presumably also true for issue perception. However, as previously mentioned, this 
suppression of voicing an opinion or perception is less pronounced among people who attach 
more importance to the issue, making these individuals more inclined to express their thoughts 
regardless of the perceived majority opinion. The data partially support this notion: men and 
women who are more critical the development of climate change, immigration or criminality 
are more likely to engage in discussion about these issues with friends and family than others. 
The same is true for alternative media users on the issues of immigration and crime. Once again, 
it must be stressed that perceiving the development of climate change, immigration or 
criminality negatively do not deviate utterly with the majority according to the data. However, 
the study found backing for the idea that women are more susceptible to influence through 
communication than men. This supports hypothesis H3b and provides further empirical 
validation of – not only the integration of interpersonal communication into RSM-studies – the 
magnitude of gender dynamics.  
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5.4 Mediation, reciprocal influences and reinforcing spirals  
Overall, the results suggest that selective exposure to alternative media is likely to be an 
important factor that contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of one’s perception of 
climate change, immigration and criminality, answering RQ5. Looking at each issue separately, 
nevertheless, media as well as the selection effects, differ substantially. With regards to effect 
strength, however, the effect of issue perception on using alternative media was more 
substantial than the effect of using alternative media on issue perception (as previously 
displayed in Table 4, 5 and 6). On the issue of immigration, reinforcing, though not spiralling, 
processes were found among women. Nonetheless, the path analysis demonstrates, as 
mentioned above, that male has a significant, negative effect on immigration perception. This 
means that women are more prone to develop increasingly sceptical perceptions about 
immigration via interaction within their social network and selective exposure, while neither 
mediation analyses nor the RSM can explain men’s perception. Distinguished patterns of 
reinforcing spirals were yet detected on the issue of climate change. People who do not perceive 
climate change developments as very negative are more likely to select alternative media, and 
such consumption reinforces these perceptions of climate change. The same holds reversely.  
 
Lastly, previous studies suggesting that alternative media consumption, in conformity with 
RSM rhetoric, may strengthen and reinforce people’s pre-existing beliefs, thus seem to be 
accurate. However, the findings of this study indicate that the main danger of a fragmented 
media environment in which alternative media is expanding is not the polarization of ordinary 
people, nor men and women as subgroups – but the risk of a growing disconnect between the 
alternative media audience and the modestly involved masses. These findings are largely in line 
with Levendusky (2013, p.2), who suggests that partisan, biased programs only take viewers 
who are already polarized and make them even more extreme, concluding that “[p]artisan media 
therefore heighten mass polarization not by turning moderates into extremists, but rather by 
further polarizing those who are already away from the political center.” Moreover, while most 
people still rely heavily on mainstream media and will not select nor be directly targeted by 
alternative media, there is yet reason to believe that alternative media messages will be 
disseminated through communication practices, reaching a far bigger audience than is observed 
in the data.  
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6 Conclusion  
In academia, as well as in mainstream media, people are voicing concern that a fragmented 
media environment with an immense increase of politically biased alternative media may 
motivate selective exposure, in turn leading to increasingly polarized perceptions of reality 
among the public. In the meantime, a growing ideological gender gap is noted. Hence, this study 
examines media-driven belief polarization processes, focusing on alternative media usage and 
gender contingent differences. Theoretically building on the RSM (Slater, 2007, 2015), the 
thesis used a three-wave panel survey conducted in Sweden over a period of two years to study 
the extent to which selective exposure occurs and the mutual influences between selective 
exposure and prior beliefs. It also aimed to add to the field of longitudinal studies of the RSM 
by incorporating interpersonal communication to disentangle its effect of in the RSM-process.  
 
In comparison to most polarization and RSM-research, this study does not examine public 
opinion or attitudes, but people’s perceptions of reality. The perception focus is crucial to be 
able to provide explanations or predictions of what may happen in a later stage of a causal chain. 
For instance, knowing how people perceive the issue of immigration may hint how they will 
vote in the next election. An individual’s perceptions of reality are furthermore expected to 
influence other attitudes and opinions. Discrepancies in perceptions of societal-level issues 
among the public is also a central indicator of polarization. A well-functioning democratic 
discourse requires that most people, at least to some extent, agree on the state of affairs. A 
society in which citizens have widely differing perceptions of reality is more polarized and 
potentially more conflict-ridden than a society in which the majority shares roughly the same 
view of factual relations (Nordin & Oscarsson, 2015). The study thus observed the factors 
driving alternative media usage and how such usage influences men’s and women’s formation 
and maintenance of perceptions towards three societal level issues: climate change, 
immigration and crime. It hypothesised that alternative media usage is partly driven by selective 
exposure, explained by prior beliefs. Similarly, such beliefs should, at least partly, be formed 
and maintained by media effects. Selective exposure should thus explain issue perception. In 
other words, this thesis has examined the power dynamics between media effects and selective 
exposure. It also studied if reinforcing processes differ between men and women, hypothesising 
that they would – an assumption which was supported. However, the results do not indicate that 
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perceptions of societal-level issues generally are becoming more conflicting. Throughout the 
panel-study, perceptions among the public even converged on two out of three issues. For the 
issue of climate change, the variance in perceptions was very low, yet increased slightly in the 
third wave. With regards to gender, there were small changes in the distribution of assessments 
over time. The thesis also shows that alternative media may influence the broader public 
through a classic two-step flow process. Having equipped with the information and views 
provided by the alternative media, the people actively seeking-out alternative media may 
become opinion leaders for their friends and family. Furthermore, it deems reasonable to expect 
that this audience also disseminates the messages from alternative media with their friends via 
social media, although this study cannot validate this assumption. In that case, however, the 
attentive alternative media audience – although constituting a minority in the society – may 
exert a disproportionately large influence on issue perception among the public. 
 
Considering which hypotheses were supported or not, results are not self-explanatory. 
Considering H1 and H3b, there is no universal threshold for what constitutes a perception 
divergence and how substantial effect differences are required to be able to argue that women 
are more affected by these RSM-mechanisms than men.  However, this thesis has argued that 
its findings suggest pertinent, lasting gender differences, as displayed in Table 7 below. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 7. Answering the hypotheses 
 
Supported Partly supported Not supported 
H1 X   
H2a   X 
H2b   X 
H3a  X  
H3b X   
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This thesis hence suggests that alternative media can have polarizing effects on societal level 
issue perception. While men are more prone to seek out alternative media in the first place, 
women who turn to these platforms are subjects for more substantial RSM processes – 
especially when accounting for interpersonal communication. This partly indicates gender 
contingent differences in tendency of polarization through RSM-processes and gender as a 
significant predictor of issue perception. However, this study did not find support for a growing 
gender gap in how men and women perceive salient issues on the public and political agenda, 
but rather indications of convergence. Instead of group formations with distinctive 
irreconcilable issue perceptions, the data do neither speak to group formation at the centre. 
Instead, data from this panel study indicates that the public as a whole is developing 
increasingly negative perceptions about the issue of immigration and crime. In other words, 
patterns of belief polarization in the Swedish society does not point to entire populations gaining 
more divergent issue perceptions, but rather that the gap between centrist individuals and 
individuals whom already obtain critical perceptions, may be increasing through selective 
exposure.  
 
Taken together, the key finding of this thesis is that gender indeed matters. The results 
specifically point towards the following:  
  
(1) Substantial and significant gender gaps in sociotropic beliefs over time. 
 (2) The disparity in media usage and interpersonal communication cannot account for these 
gender differences when controlling for ideology and political interest.  
(3) Signs of reinforcing spirals between alternative media, sociotropic beliefs and interpersonal 
communication – yet partially conditioned by gender.  
  
6.1 Limitations 
Like any other study, this is not one without flaws or limitations. To begin with, one limitation 
with the use of SEM/cross-lagged models is that it is not possible to examine individual 
differences in time. It would, for instance, have been valuable to examine individual differences 
in terms of media usage. From the analyses conducted in this study, it is not possible to 
distinguish if alternative media users refrain from mainstream media, or if they rather have a 
mixed media diet. From a democratic perspective, it could be problematic if some groups in 
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society choose to distance themselves from mainstream platforms of public discourse and 
isolate themselves in counter-publics. There is a risk that discourses of mistrust and alienation 
in conventional democratic channels could be fostered and amplified in such environments 
(Kobayashi & Ikeda, 2009).  
 
Moreover, it is not, according to Slater (2015), a matter of linear growth for both media use and 
attitude/opinion/perception strength, but limited times in which reinforcing spirals occur. How 
to measure sequential dynamics is yet a topic of discussion among scholars, and whether the 
panel study examined in this thesis successfully managed to capture these dynamics remains 
up to future studies to establish.  
 
Another limitation of the study is the mainstream media index. As the aim of this thesis 
primarily was to examine polarizing effects of alternative media, platforms which commonly 
position themselves as correctives of the mainstream news media, mainstream media was 
foremost considered as a dichotomous branch of news media orientation. In retrospect, it would 
perhaps have been more advantageous to differentiate between broadcast newspaper, tabloids, 
commercial tv and public service to get a fuller understanding to what extent alternative media 
differ from the news media most people consume. This would, nonetheless, require more time 
and space. Another option would have been to focus on partisan selective exposure, like most 
studies interested in the RSM and polarization processes. In the Swedish case, however, the 
difference in the editorial content is not as profound as in countries with other media systems.  
 
Relating to RQ3 and what role interpersonal communication plays in an RSM-process, the items 
in the indexes do not answer how the respondents’ social network composition looks like. While 
this thesis, based on prior research, assumes that most people pertain to homogenous social 
networks, this is naturally not always the case, and other studies have found that people who 
are surrounded by heterogeneous environments are less likely to resist dissonant political media 
messages (Song & Boomgaarden, 2017). Thus, the analyses and interpretation of interpersonal 
communication effects are limited.  
  
Finally, one of the most interesting questions about gender differences in perception 
development and media use is their origins, as the answer may hold the key to the future 
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dynamics of the gender gap in public opinion. According to Huddy et al. (2008, p. 48) “Political 
differences emerge from elemental differences between men and women that cross political 
context, fleeting and more ephemeral factors embedded within specific cultures and polities, or 
some mixture of the two.” Because this thesis relies upon secondary data (and it is beyond the 
scope of the study to conduct supplementary data), it cannot fully account for the demonstrated 
gender differences. It would then have been, if not beneficial – interesting, to compare for 
instance how personality traits, perceived vulnerability, nationality, culture and values (more 
pinned down than controlling for ideology) affect perception development and maintenance.   
 
6.2 Future research  
As recognised in the introduction, the literature pool on the RSM lacks research with a gender 
approach. While some studies have been conducted focusing on selective exposure, no studies 
to this author’s knowledge have examined if and how men and women are equally susceptible 
to such exposure. Thus, further attention should be devoted to gender as a key variable (rather 
than a control variable) in media effect research to determine whether or not news media 
exposure affects men and women differently. This should preferably be done utilizing a 
multidisciplinary approach that enabled an assessment of the combined influence of clusters of 
factors that previously have been identified as drivers of gender differences. Moreover, the 
reason for more male than female responses in the issue perception-indexes – albeit a majority 
of the respondents were women – was most likely because more women chose the “don’t 
know”-option. If a similar pattern can be detected in other perception-studies, it is something 
which ought to be paid more attention. Can gender gaps in news media consumption and 
interpersonal communication explain these, ostensibly, knowledge gaps? Are they even 
knowledge gaps, or are men simply more inclined to guess (as predicted by theories of risk 
aversion)? Are women more prone to self-doubt? Regardless of which underlying factors are at 
play, this feasible tendency may lead to inflated estimates of men’s political and societal 
knowledge relative to that of women. 
 
Furthermore, more research should be devoted to why people are seeking out alternative media 
outside the conventional news providers. Pertaining to alternative media as a liberating force 
that gives voice to marginalized groups in the hegemonic discourse, it may be a sign that some 
individuals feel that they cannot participate on equal terms in mainstream media. This may, in 
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turn, become an impediment to deliberation between conflicting groups, challenging the 
democratic system (Holt, 2018). Besides, in order to come to more valid conclusions regarding 
alternative media’s effect on polarization, more rigorous empirical analysis of reach, impact 
and reactions from other media, needs to be done.  
 
Additionally, considering interpersonal communication’s possibly moderating effect on climate 
change perception among alternative media users, future studies should pay more attention to 
interpersonal communication’s potential conditioning effects on (de)polarization. In addition to 
its direct and conditioning effect on perceptions, the composition of a person’s immediate social 
environment should be taken into account as this may bolster or alter the influence of mass 
media exposure (e.g., Song & Boomgaarden, 2017).  
 
Finally, as mentioned aloft, belief studies are essential to provide explanations or predictions 
of how people will act in the future. Perceptions are also expected to influence attitudes and 
opinions. In this respect, coupled with the significant findings of this thesis, perception of reality 
is an under-researched area in Swedish opinion and media studies. To maintain a well-operating 
democratic discourse, or to be able to foresee political polarization, it is crucial to learn more 
about how perceptions of reality are created, disseminated and changed. It would also be 
intriguing to make systematic comparisons between people’s subjective perceptions of reality 
and more objective indicators of relationships, and how they vary with each other over time. 
How accurate are people’s perceptions of the world around them? What kind of knowledge do 
they have? By studying people’s perceptions of three societal-level issues, this thesis found that 
people are often systematically coloured by ideological predispositions such as left-right 
ideology, media usage, social networks, or their gender. While it is hard to draw any firm 
conclusions, it does indeed seem like people are wearing different glasses when looking at the 
world. On this note, it would also be interesting to compare if and to what extent such glasses 
differ cross-nationally, as results suggested by this thesis only account for a Swedish context. 
Such studies would, amongst others, increase the odds of foreseeing polarization processes on 
a larger scale. Thus, systematic comparisons between nations could prove beneficial.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Gender Differences in Belief Polarization (Percent) 
   
How do you 
perceive the issue 
of… 
    Not so 
negative 
perception 
Moderately 
negative 
perception 
Very 
negative 
perception 
Sum N Balance Gender  
Gap (men) 
Mean 
(scale  
1-6) 
Variance 
(scale 1-
6) 
Criminality*** Wave 1 Women 23 38 38 100 657 +15  3.91 2.44 
    Men 21 31 48 100 750 +27 +12 4.15 2.57 
    Total 22 35 43 100 1,407 +21  4.04 2.52 
  Wave 2 Women 22 37 41 100 555  +19  3.99 2.42 
    Men 20 31 34 100 661  +14 -5 4.17 2.55 
    Total 41 49 46 100 1,216  +5  4.09 2.47 
  Wave 3 Women 20 34 46 100 480  +26  4.16 2.30 
    Men 18 30 52 100 566  +34 +8 4.25 2.41 
    Total 19 32 49 100 1,046  +30  4.20 2.36 
Immigration*** Wave 1 Women 6 36 58 100 681 +52  4.65 1.47 
    Men 4 23 73 100 804 +69 +17 5.03 1.41 
    Total 5 29 66 100 1,485 +61  4.86 1.47 
  Wave 2 Women 7 39 53 100 554  +46  4.54 1.60 
    Men  6 25 69 100 669  +63 +17 4.95 1.42 
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    Total 7 31 62 100 1,223  +55  4.76 1.53 
  Wave 3 Women 4 33 63 100 566  +59  4.80 1.29 
    Men 6 25 70 100 662  +64 +5 4.99 1.51 
    Total 5 28 67 100 1,228  +62  4.90 1.42 
Climate 
change*** 
Wave 1 Women 2 22 76 100 964 +74  5.15 0.92 
    Men 3 28 69 100 984 +64 -10 5.01 1.15 
    Total 2 25 73 100 1,948 +71  5.07 1.04 
  Wave 2 Women 1 18 81 100 554  +80  5.26 0.87 
    Men 4 25 72 100 669  +68 -12 5.02 1.20 
    Total 3 21 76 100 1,223  +74  5.15 1.04 
  Wave 3 Women 2 23 74 100 810  +72  5.15 1.11 
    Men 5 29 66 100 805  +61 -9 4.85 1.46 
    Total 4 26 70 100 1,615  +64  5.01 1.28 
 
Notes: Each specific issue are measured through an index, composed by a set of descriptive statements, as presented aloft. The balance measure 
is the proportion not so negative perception − proportion very negative perception. For men and women, a low balance value indicates within 
group-belief polarization, while the total balance value indicates belief polarization on a societal level. A high value indicates critical, yet 
homogenous, perceptions. The gender gap indicates the distance between men and women with regards to the balance measure, where + 
indicates that men have a more negative perception of the issue. The variance signifies the degree to which any two randomly selected 
respondents are expected to differ in their opinions. Thus, variance increases when perceptions becomes more polarized. Kurtosis serves to tap 
bimodality (if people with different issue perception cluster into separate camps, with locations between the two modal positions sparsely 
occupied). Kurtosis is positive when a distribution is peaked, and negative when it is flatter than the normal distribution.
 81 
 
Note: The questions were: Mainstream media: “How often to you use news from the following news outlets 
(traditional channels or on the Internet): DN/SvD/GP/Aftonbladet/Expressen/News from SVT/News from 
SR/News from TV4 or local news?” Aftonbladet and SVT were chosen because they have the highest mean out 
of the media platforms and demonstrate that the gender gap differs depending on platform. N = 2,133. 
Alternative media: “How often do you use online news websites or social media to follow... (1) News about 
societal issues not reported by the traditional media, (2) News that provide an alternative view on societal 
issues than traditional media (3) News that target societal issues the way I see them, as well as (4) News that 
provide new perspectives on important societal issues" and “How often do you use online news websites or 
social media to follow news that provide an alternative view than the traditional media on the following topics? 
(5) News about crime, (6) News about the climate and environment, as well as (7) News about integration and 
immigration?“ N = 2,179. 
 
Figure 13. Gender Differences in News Use: SVT (percent)  
 
  
Note: The question was, “How often to you use news from the following news outlets (traditional channels or 
on the Internet): News from SVT”? The response alternatives ranged from never to daily. M = 4.50, SD = 1.00, 
N = 2,133.  
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Never
2
3
4
5
Daily
Man Kvinna
Appendix 2. Media consumption 
 
Table 8.  Media consumption mean (standard errors in parentheses). 
  
 
Total Men Women 
    
Mainstream Index 2.92 (1.00) 2.98 (1.04) 2.87 (0.95) 
      Aftonbladet 3.07 (1.88) 3.12 (1.90) 3.02 (1.87) 
      SVT  4.50 (1.67) 4.46 (1.68) 4.54 (1.65) 
    
Alternative Index 2.82 (1.39) 3.05 (1.45) 2.59 (1.29) 
      Alt crime 2.75 (1.54) 3.03 (1.61) 2.49 (1.42) 
      Alt climate 2.66 (1.35) 2.75 (1.36) 2.58 (1.33) 
      Alt immigration 2.70 (1.50) 2.94 (1.58) 2.47 (1.39) 
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Figure 14. Gender Differences in News Use: Aftonbladet (percent)  
 
  
Note: The question was, “How often to you use news from the following news outlets (traditional channels or 
on the Internet): Aftonbladet”? The response alternatives ranged from never to daily. M = 3.07, SD = 1.88, N = 
2,217.  
 
 
Figure 15. Gender Differences in News Use: Index Alternative Media (percent)  
  
 
  
Note: The questions were, “How often do you use online news websites or social media to follow... (1) News 
about societal issues not reported by the traditional media, (2) News that provide an alternative view on 
societal issues than traditional media (3) News that target societal issues the way I see them, as well as (4) News 
that provide new perspectives on important societal issues" and “How often do you use online news websites 
or social media to follow news that provide an alternative view than the traditional media on the following 
topics? (5) News about crime, (6) News about the climate and environment, as well as (7) News about 
integration and immigration?“ The response alternatives ranged from never to daily. M = 2.82, SD = 1.39, N = 
2,179. 
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Appendix 3. Gender Differences in Societal Issue Perceptions  
 
Figure 16. Gender Differences in Crime Perceptions: Index Descriptive Statements, Wave 1 
 
  
Note: The questions were, “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on crime of violence and 
criminality. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?” (1) During the past years, crime(s) of 
violence have increased, (2) Crimes of violence have decreased in Sweden since the 1950s, (3) More violent 
crimes per inhabitant are committed in Sweden than in our neighbouring countries and (4) The issue of violent 
crimes is often exaggerated in the public discourse." M = 4.04, SD = 1.59, Variance = 2.52, Skewness = -.35, 
Kurtosis = 1.98, N = 1,407. 
 
Figure 17. Gender Differences in Immigration Perceptions: Index Descriptive Statements, Wave 1 
 
Notes: The questions were, “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on integration and 
immigration. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1) Problems related to integration of 
immigrants into Swedish society have increased during the past decade, (2) Integration of immigrants into the 
Swedish society have improved since the 1960s, (3) Integration of immigrants is more successful in Sweden 
than our neighbouring countries and (4) The issue of integration of immigrants is often exaggerated in the 
public discourse." M = 4.86, SD = 1.21, Variance = 1.47, Skewness = -.91, Kurtosis = 3.12, N = 1,485. 
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Figure 18. Gender Differences in Climate Perceptions: Index Descriptive Statements, Wave 1 
 
Notes: The questions were, “Different claims are sometimes heard in public discourse on climate change. To 
what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1) Global average temperatures have increased in 
the past 100 years, (2) Scientists disagree on whether climate change is taking place, (3) Droughts, heavy 
storms and floods become worse due to climate change, (4) Sweden won’t be affected by climate change the 
next decades and (5) The issue of climate change is often exaggerated in the public discourse." M = 5.09, SD = 
1.02, Variance = 1.04, Skewness = -1.01, Kurtosis = 3.64, N = 1,948. 
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged 
structural equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  
 
 
Appendix 4. Path Models  
 
Table 9. Path model of gender, news media use and climate change 
perception, wave 1. Standardised path coefficients.   
     
  Model 1   Model 2  
  Coef. z Coef. z 
Alternative 
Media               
 Male .17*** (.02) 8.11 .10*** (.02) 4.70 
 Age   -.09*** (.02) -4.38 
 Education    -.10*** (.02) -4.56 
 Ideology   .16*** (.02) 7.63 
 Political interest   .22*** (.02) 10.90 
      
Mainstream 
Media      
 Male .06** (.02) 2.58 .04 (.02) 1.80 
 Age   .34*** (.02) 18.21 
 Education   .04 (.02) 1.89 
 Ideology   .09*** (.02) 4.58 
 Political interest   .15*** (.02) 7.61 
 
Interpersonal 
communication 
(IPC)              
 Male -.06** (.02) -2.72 -.06** (.02) -2.64 
 Alternative media .10*** (.02) 4.79 .10*** (.02) 4.42 
 Mainstream media .10*** (.02) 4.66 .11*** (.02) 4.58 
 Age   -.06* (.02) -2.50 
 Education   .04 (.02) 1.92 
 Ideology   -.14*** (.02) -6.89 
 Political interest   .15*** (.02) 6.71 
      
Climate 
change 
perception      
 Male -.02 (.02) -1.06 -.00 (.02) -0.17 
 Alternative media -.22*** (.02) -10.07 -.21*** (.02) -9.56 
 Mainstream media -.07** (.02) -2.96 .00 (.02) 0.02 
 IPC .21*** (.03) 9.40  .15*** (.02) 6.66 
 Age   -.17*** (.02) -7.65 
 Education   .11*** (.02) 5.27 
 Ideology   -.20*** (.02) -9.29 
 Political interest   .06** (.02) 2.58 
             
χ 2 (df)  55.227 (1)  26.630 (2)  
RMSEA  0.154  0.073  
CFI  0.845  0.982  
R2  .03  .27  
N  2,291  2,288  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged 
structural equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  
 
Table 10. Path model of gender, news media use and crime 
perception, wave 1. Standardised path coefficients.   
    
  Model 1   Model 2  
  Coef. z Coef. z 
Alternative 
Media               
 Male .17*** (.02) 8.14 .10*** (.02) 4.72 
 Age   -.09*** (.02) -4.31 
 Education    -.09*** (.02) -4.47 
 Ideology   .16*** (.02) 7.73 
 Political interest   .22*** (.02) 10.90 
      
Mainstream 
Media      
 Male .06** (.02) 2.63 .04 (.02) 1.83 
 Age   .34*** (.02) 18.23 
 Education   .04 (.02) 1.83 
 Ideology   .09*** (.02) 4.54 
 Political interest   .16*** (.02) 7.66 
 
Interpersonal 
communication 
(IPC)              
 Male .03 (.02) 1.61 -.01 (.02) -0.44 
 Alternative media .30*** (.02) 14.84 .25*** (.02) 12.31 
 Mainstream media .18*** (.02) 9.01 .15*** (.02) 7.05 
 Age   .01 (.02) 0.67 
 Education   -.10*** (.02) -5.34 
 Ideology   .18*** (.02) 9.33 
 Political interest   .10*** (.02) 5.00 
      
Crime 
perception      
 Male -.00 (.02) -0.00 -.05* (.02) -2.30 
 Alternative media .15*** (.02) 5.86 .13*** (.02) 5.61 
 Mainstream media .01 (.03) 0.39 .00 (.02) 0.03 
 IPC .36*** (.02) 14.88  .26*** (.02) 11.27 
 Age   .14*** (.02) 6.29 
 Education   -.13*** (.02) -6.48 
 Ideology   .39*** (.02) 19.10 
 Political interest   -.13*** (.02) -5.52 
             
χ 2 (df)  56.665 (1)  26.967 (2)  
RMSEA  0.156  0.074  
CFI  0.927  0.988  
R2  .03  .29  
N  2,291  2,288  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged 
structural equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
 
Table 11. Path model of gender, news media use and immigration 
perception, wave 1. Standardised path coefficients.   
     
  Model 1   Model 2  
  Coef. z Coef. z 
Alternative 
Media               
 Male .17*** (.02) 8.16 .10*** (.02) 4.73 
 Age   -.09*** (.02) -4.38 
 Education    -.09*** (.02) -4.57 
 Ideology   .16*** (.02) 7.68 
 Political interest   .23*** (.02) 10.93 
      
Mainstream 
Media      
 Male .06** (.02) 2.65 .04 (.02) 1.84 
 Age   .34*** (.02) 18.23 
 Education   .04 (.02) 1.88 
 Ideology   .09*** (.02) 4.56 
 Political interest   .16*** (.02) 7.65 
 
Interpersonal 
communication 
(IPC)              
 Male .02 (.02) 0.99 -.02 (.02) -1.02 
 Alternative media .31*** (.02) 15.39 .25*** (.02) 12.26 
 Mainstream media .13*** (.02) 6.19 .09*** (.02) 4.45 
 Age   -.03 (.02) -1.60 
 Education   -.03 (.02) -1.69 
 Ideology   .10*** (.02) 4.90 
 Political interest   .24*** (.02) 11.65 
      
Immigration 
perception      
 Male .12*** (.02) 4.78 .08*** (.02) 3.54 
 Alternative media .09*** (.03) 3.57 .05* (.02) 2.10 
 Mainstream media .04 (.03) 1.48 -.02 (.02) -0.85 
 IPC .21*** (.03) 8.07  .19*** (.02) 7.71 
 Age   .15*** (.02) 6.09 
 Education   -.02 (.02) -0.96 
 Ideology   .39*** (.02) 18.29 
 Political interest   -.04 (.03) -1.43 
 
χ 2 (df)  55.198 (1)  26.763 (2)  
RMSEA  0.154  0.074  
CFI  0.901  0.986  
R2  .05  .26  
      
N  2,291  2,288  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged structural 
equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
*p<.05; **p<.01;***p<.001.  
  
Appendix 5. Cross-Lagged Models  
 
Table 12. Cross-lagged models of alternative media use and climate 
change perception (standardised path coefficients)    
      
  Model 1 (women)  Model 2 (men)  
  Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 
Alternative 
media               
 
Climate change 
perception -.07* (.02) -.06* (.03) -.09** (.03) -.10*** (.03) 
 Age -.02 (.03) -.01 (.03) -.02 (.03) .03 (.03) 
 Education  -.05 (.03) -.02 (.03) .01 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
 Ideology -.04 (.03) .08** (.03) .03 (.03) .05* (.03) 
 Political interest .07* (.03) .09** (.03) .05 (.03) .11*** (.03) 
 Alternative media w1 .61*** (.03) .43*** .63*** (.02) .28*** (03) 
 Alternative media w2 - .33*** (.02) - .43*** (.02) 
      
Climate change 
perception      
 Alternative media -.06* (.03) -.09*** (.03) -.10*** (.03) -.15*** (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication -.01 (.03) .14*** (.03) -.00 (.02) .07** (.03) 
 Age -.04 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.04 (.02) 
 Education .05 (.03) .04 (.02) .09*** (.02) -.00 (.03) 
 Ideology -.09*** (.03) -.07*** (.03) -.12*** (.03) -.05* (.03) 
 Political interest .01 (.03) .01 (.03) .02 (.03) -.04 (.02) 
 
Climate change 
perception w1 .64*** (.03) .32*** (04) .65*** (.02) .32*** (03) 
 
Climate change 
perception w2  .42*** (.02) - .43*** (.02) 
      
Interpersonal 
communication              
 Alternative media .04 (.02) .03 (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) 
 
Climate change 
perception .04 (.03) .03 (.03) .09** (.03) -.03 (.03) 
 Age .03 (.03) -.05 (.03) .09** (.03) .03 (.03) 
 Education .07** (.02) -.00 (.03) .02 (.02) .00 (.03) 
 Ideology -.04 (.02) -.00 (.03) -.01 (.03) -.01 (.03) 
 Political interest .11*** (.03) -.02 (.03) .11*** (.03) .06* (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w1 .64*** (.02) .31*** (03) .56*** (.02) .28*** (03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w2 - .47*** (.02) - .47*** (.02) 
      
χ 2 (df)  89.24  89.24  
RMSEA  0.044  0.044  
CFI  0.991  0.991  
R2  .91  .89  
N  1,171  1,117  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged structural 
equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01;***p<.001.  
 
  
Table 13. Cross-lagged models of mainstream media use and climate 
change perception (standardised path coefficients)    
      
  Model 1 (women)  Model 2 (men)  
  Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 
Mainstream 
media               
 
Climate change 
perception -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Age .12*** (.03) .04 (.03) .11*** (.03) .11*** (.02) 
 Education  .01 (.03) .00 (.03) .04 (.03) -.01 (.03) 
 Ideology .00 (.02) .04 (.02) -.03 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Political interest .06** (.02) .05* (.02) .02 (.03) .01 (.02) 
 Mainstream media w1 .70*** (.02) .32*** (03) .71*** (.02) .33*** (03) 
 Mainstream media w2 - .51*** (.02) - .52*** (.02) 
      
Climate change 
perception      
 Mainstream media -.02 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication -.02 (.03) .13*** (.03) -.01 (.02) .06* (.03) 
 Age -.02 (.03) -.03 (.03) .00 (.03) -.02 (.02) 
 Education .05* (.03) .05 (.02) .09*** (.02) .00 (.03) 
 Ideology -.09*** (.03) -.06** (.03) -.13*** (.03) -.07** (.03) 
 Political interest .01 (.03) .00 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.06* (.03) 
 
Climate change 
perception w1 .65*** (.03) .32*** (04) .67*** (.02) .33*** (03) 
 
Climate change 
perception w2 - .43*** (.02) - .46*** (.02) 
      
Interpersonal 
communication              
 Mainstream media .01 (.03) .00 (.03) .01 (.03) .03 (.03) 
 
Climate change 
perception .03 (.03) .02 (.03) .09** (.03) -.04 (.03) 
 Age .02 (.03) -.05* (.03) .08** (.03) .02 (.03) 
 Education .07** (.02) .00 (.03) .02 (.02) -.00 (.03) 
 Ideology -.04 (.02) -.00 (.03) .00 (.03) -.00 (.03) 
 Political interest .12*** (.03) -.01 (.03) .11*** (.03) .07* (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w1 .64*** (.02) .31*** (03) .56*** (.02) .27*** (03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w2 - .47*** (.02) - .47*** (.02) 
      
χ 2 (df)  53.46  53.46  
RMSEA  0.028  0.028  
CFI  0.997  0.997  
R2  .93  .92  
N  1,171  1,117  
 90 
 
 
Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged structural 
equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  
  
Table 14. Cross-lagged models of alternative media use and crime 
perception (standardised path coefficients)    
      
  Model 1 (women)  Model 2 (men)  
  Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 
Alternative 
media               
 Crime perception .11** (.04) .14*** (.04) .13***(.04) .02 (.03) 
 Age -.04 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.02 (.03) .04 (.03) 
 Education  -.03 (.03) .01 (.03) .01 (.03) -.04 (.03) 
 Ideology -.06* (.03) .05* (.03) -.01 (.03) .06* (.03) 
 Political interest .08*** (.03) .10*** (.03) .05* (.03) .11*** (.03) 
 Alternative media w1 .60*** (.02) .43*** (03) .62*** (.02) .30*** (03) 
 Alternative media w2 - .32*** (.02) - .44*** (.02) 
      
Crime 
perception      
 Alternative media .02 (.03) .01 (.02) .02 (.03) .01 (.02) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication .08** (.03) -.03 (.02) .03 (.03) .00 (.02) 
 Age .11*** (.03) -.01 (.02) .06* (.02) .02 (.02) 
 Education -.10*** (.03) -.06** (.02) -.07** (.02) -.01 (.02) 
 Ideology .04 (.03) .03 (.02) .07** (.03) .08*** (.02) 
 Political interest -.05* (.03) -.01 (.02) .03 (.03) -.01  (.02) 
 Crime perception w1 .69*** (.03) .23*** (04) .76*** (.02) .10** (.03) 
 Crime perception w2 - .70*** (.02) - .79*** (.02) 
      
Interpersonal 
communication              
 Alternative media .07** (.03) .04 (.03) .00 (.02) .03 (.03) 
 Crime perception .14*** (.04) .13*** (.04) .16*** (.03) .16*** (.03) 
 Age .02 (.03) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) .06** (.03) 
 Education -.01 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.06** (.02) -.00 (.03) 
 Ideology .04 (.03) .02 (.03) .01 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Political interest .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .07* (.03) .08*** (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w1 .58*** (.02) .34*** (03) .61*** (.03) .38*** (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w2 - .37*** (.02) - .32*** (.03) 
      
χ 2 (df)  133.73  133.73  
RMSEA  0.057  0.057  
CFI  0.986  0.986  
R2  .93  .93  
N  1,117  1,171  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged structural 
equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  
  
Table 15. Cross-lagged models of mainstream media use and crime 
perception (standardised path coefficients)    
      
  Model 1 (women)  Model 2 (men)  
  Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 
Mainstream 
media               
 Crime perception .03 (.03) -.00 (.02) .03 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Age .11*** (.03) .05 (.03) .10*** (.03) .11*** (.02) 
 Education  .01 (.02) .00 (.02) .05* (.02) -.00 (.02) 
 Ideology -.01 (.02) .04 (.02) -.04 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Political interest .06** (.02) .05* (.02) .03 (.02) .01 (.02) 
 Mainstream media w1 .70*** (.02) .32*** (03) .70*** (.02) .33*** (03) 
 Mainstream media w2 - .51*** (.02) - .51*** (.02) 
      
Crime 
perception      
 Mainstream media .03 (.03) -.01 (.02) -.06* (.03) -.05* (.02) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication .08** (.03) -.02 (.02) .04 (.02) .02 (.02) 
 Age .10*** (.03) -.01 (.02) .08** (.03) .03 (.02) 
 Education -.10*** (.03) -.07** (.02) -.06** (.02) -.00 (.02) 
 Ideology .04 (.03) .03 (.02) .07** (.03) .08*** (.02) 
 Political interest -.05* (.03) -.01 (.02) .04 (.03) .01 (.02) 
 Crime perception w1 .69*** (.03) .23*** (04) .77*** (.02) .10*** (03) 
 Crime perception w2 - .70*** (.02) - .79*** (.02) 
      
Interpersonal 
communication              
 Mainstream media .03 (.03) .06** (.03) .05* (.03) .08*** (.03) 
 Crime perception .15*** (.04) .13*** (.04) .15*** (.03) .17*** (.03) 
 Age -.00 (.03) .00 (.03) .00 (.03) .03 (.03) 
 Education -.01 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.07** (.02) -.01 (.03) 
 Ideology .04 (.03) .01 (.03) .01 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Political interest .05* (.03) .04 (.03) .06* (.03) .08** (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w1 .59*** (.02) .34*** (03) .61*** (.03) .38*** (03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w2 - .38*** (.02) - .32*** (.03) 
      
χ 2 (28)  95.75  95.75  
RMSEA  0.046  0.046  
CFI  0.992  0.992  
R2  .95  .96  
N  1,171  1,117  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged structural 
equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01;***p<.001.  
 
  
Table 16. Cross-lagged models of alternative media use and immigration 
perception (standardised path coefficients)    
      
  Model 1 (women)  Model 2 (men)  
  Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 
Alternative 
media               
 Immigration perception .04 (.04) .08** (.04) .05 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Age -.02 (.03) .00 (.03) -.01 (.03) .04 (.03) 
 Education  -.05 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.00 (.03) -.04 (.03) 
 Ideology -.04 (.03) .06* (.03) .03 (.03) .07* (.03) 
 Political interest .07* (.03) .08** (.03) -.05 (.03) .11*** (.03) 
 Alternative media w1 .62*** (.02) .43*** (03) .64*** (.02) .30*** (03) 
 Alternative media w2 - .34*** (.02) - .44*** (.02) 
      
Immigration 
perception      
 Alternative media .01 (.03) .01 (.02) -.02 (.03) -.03 (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication .09** (.03) .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .01 (.02) 
 Age .09** (.03) .01 (.04) -.01 (.03) .01 (.02) 
 Education -.07* (.03) -.04 (.02) -.03 (.03) -.04 (.03) 
 Ideology .16*** (.03) .04 (.04) .17*** (.03) .09** (.03) 
 Political interest -.04 (.03) .06 (.04) .01 (.03) .03 (.02) 
 Immigration perception w1 .61*** (.03) .34*** (05) .65*** (.03) .46*** (04) 
 Immigration perception w2 - .46*** (.03) - .35*** (.04) 
      
Interpersonal 
communication              
 Alternative media .10*** (.03) .06** (.03) .06* (.03) .04 (.03) 
 Immigration perception .04 (.04) .11*** (.03) .04 (.03) .06* (.03) 
 Age .01 (.03) .06* (.03) .06* (.03) .03 (.03) 
 Education .01 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.03 (.02) -.05* (.02) 
 Ideology .02 (.03) .00 (.03) .07* (.03) .05* (.03) 
 Political interest .00 (.03) .02 (.03) .05* (.03) .08** (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w1 .60*** (.02) .32*** (03) .62*** (.02) .32*** (03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w2 - .44*** (.02) - .44*** (.03) 
      
χ 2 (df)  88.22  88.22  
RMSEA  0.043  0.043  
CFI  0.991  0.991  
R2  .90  .93  
N  1,171  1,117  
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Note: RMSEA: root mean square error approximation; CFI: comparative fit index. Results from cross-lagged structural 
equations models (using full information maximum likelihood estimation). Standardised path coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
*p<.05; **p<.01;***p<.001.  
 
  
Table 17. Cross-lagged models of mainstream media use and immigration 
perception (standardised path coefficients)    
      
  Model 1 (women)  Model 2 (men)  
  Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 Wave 1-2 Wave 2-3 
Mainstream 
media               
 Immigration perception .05 (.03) -.03 (.03) .01 (.03) -.04 (.03) 
 Age .11*** (.03) .05* (.02) .11*** (.03) .11*** (.02) 
 Education  .01 (.02) .00 (.02) .04 (.03) -.01 (.02) 
 Ideology -.01 (.02) .05* (.03) -.03 (.03) .03 (.02) 
 Political interest .06** (.02) .05* (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.02) 
 Mainstream media w1 .70*** (.02) .32*** (03) .71*** (.02) .33*** (03) 
 Mainstream media w2 - .51*** (.02) - .52*** (.02) 
      
Immigration 
perception      
 Mainstream media -.02 (.03) .03 (.04) -.01 (.03) -.00 (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication .10** (.03) .04 (.03) .03 (.03) .01 (.02) 
 Age .09** (.04) .00 (.04) -.01 (.03) .02 (.02) 
 Education -.07* (.03) -.03 (.02) -.03 (.03) -.04 (.03) 
 Ideology .16*** (.03) .03 (.04) .17*** (.03) .08** (.03) 
 Political interest -.03 (.03) .05 (.04) .00 (.03) .03 (.02) 
 Immigration perception w1 .61*** (.03) .34*** (05) .65*** (.03) .46*** (04) 
 Immigration perception w2 - .46*** (.05) - .35*** (.02) 
      
Interpersonal 
communication              
 Mainstream media .04 (.03) .04 (.03) .03 (.03) .05 (.03) 
 Immigration perception .03 (.04) .10** (.03) .04 (.03) .07* (.03) 
 Age -.01 (.03) .05 (.03) .04 (.03) .01 (.03) 
 Education .00 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.04 (.02) -.05** (.02) 
 Ideology .02 (.03) .00 (.03) .07** (.03) .05* (.03) 
 Political interest .02 (.03) .02** (.03) .06* (.03) .08** (.03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w1 .63*** (.02) .32*** (03) .66*** (.02) .33*** (03) 
 
Interpersonal 
communication w2 - .44*** (.02) - .44*** (.02) 
      
χ 2 (df)  71.25  71.25  
RMSEA  0.037  0.037  
CFI  0.994  0.994  
R2  .92  .95  
N  1,171  1,117  
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Appendix 6. Cross-Lagged Models – Mainstream media figures 
 
 
Figure 19. Cross-lagged effects between mainstream media use, climate change perception and 
interpersonal communication. Group comparison, female/male (standardised path coefficients). 
 
 
 
Note: N = 2,288 estimates are standardised path coefficients. All equations control for age, education, 
ideology and political interest (see full model in Table 10). Autoregressive paths between wave 1 and wave 3 
allowed. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Cross-lagged effects between mainstream media use, crime perception and 
interpersonal communication. Group comparison, female/male (standardised path coefficients). 
 
 
 
Note: N = 2,288 estimates are standardised path coefficients. All equations control for age, education, 
ideology and political interest (see full model in Table 12). Autoregressive paths between wave 1 and wave 3 
allowed. 
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Figure 21. Cross-lagged effects between mainstream media use, immigration perception and 
interpersonal communication. Group comparison, female/male (standardised path coefficients). 
 
 
 
Note: N = 2,288 estimates are standardised path coefficients. All equations control for age, education, 
ideology and political interest (see full model in Table 14). Autoregressive paths between wave 1 and wave 3 
allowed. 
 
 
